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Abstract
Marijuana legalization is sweeping the nation. Recreational marijuana
use is legal in eight states. Medical marijuana use is legal in thirteen
states. Only three states maintain an absolute criminal prohibition on
marijuana use. Many of these legalization initiatives propose to regulate
marijuana in a manner similar to alcohol, and many titles are variations
of the “Regulate Marijuana Like Alcohol Act.” For political and public
health reasons the analogy makes sense, but it also reveals a regulatory
blind spot. States may be using alcohol as a model for regulating the
distribution, retail, and consumption of marijuana, but marijuana is much
more than a retail product. It is also an agricultural product, and by some
measures, the largest cash crop in the United States. Since marijuana
prohibition laws were passed long before any cultivation regulations,
states now face an unprecedented challenge: to regulate, for the first time
ever, one of the country’s largest agricultural industries.
Major regulatory challenges lie ahead, and how states respond to those
challenges will shape the course of the marijuana industry. At present,
there is a lack of understanding of the regulatory challenges marijuana
agriculture presents and the options states have to address them. This
Article identifies those challenges and the regulatory approaches most
capable of addressing them. The study begins by describing the existing
state of marijuana agriculture regulations. States are likely to find that the
marijuana industry’s unique characteristics justify a tailored regulatory
approach; relying on existing agricultural policies may be ineffectual or
lead to perverse outcomes. Next, the study explores fundamental
questions about the “marijuana fragmentation spectrum.” Will the
industry come to be dominated by agricultural conglomerates massproducing a marijuana commodity, as many have feared? Or will
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governments and the industry adopt the appellation model favored by the
wine industry to protect local farmers and differentiate between products?
The study also analyzes the major environmental impacts of marijuana
agriculture, including regulations that address water allocation, water
quality, energy, organic certification, and crop insurance. Finally, the
study addresses power distribution trade-offs within marijuana
agriculture regulation frameworks, including local vs. state, and
consolidated vs. fragmented, regulatory authority dilemmas. The findings
suggest that responsible and sustainable marijuana agriculture can be
fostered at the state level, but only if regulations are responsive to the
unique and unprecedented challenges that marijuana agriculture presents.
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INTRODUCTION
Across the United States, voters are weighing the costs and benefits
of marijuana legalization. As many as sixty marijuana legalization
initiatives were proposed to appear on election ballots in 2016.1
Following the elections, recreational marijuana use is now legal in eight
states. Medical marijuana use is legal in thirteen states. Only three states
maintain an absolute criminal prohibition on marijuana use.2 As states
move toward legalization, governments will need to address a broad
range of regulatory issues, including the distribution, sale, and
consumption phases of the supply chain. But legal marijuana’s track
record so far suggests that the agricultural component of the marijuana
industry is being ignored. Whether states are failing to appreciate
marijuana’s agricultural roots or choosing to disregard them, the
industry’s direction will be out of state control until regulatory
frameworks are in place.
Nowhere has this been more apparent than in California. In 1996,
California voters passed Proposition 215, the Compassionate Use Act
(CUA).3 With the CUA, California became the first state to legalize the
medicinal use of marijuana, exempting patients and prescribing
physicians from criminal prosecution.4 The text of the Act was short and
did not address how the state or local governments should regulate the
marijuana industry. It did not, for example, assign regulatory authority to
an administrative agency, articulate limits on possession or cultivation,
or propose a broad regulatory framework from which the state or local
governments could operate.
In the wake of the CUA a legal medical marijuana industry developed
in California, and the industry experienced tremendous growth,5
notwithstanding the absence of any meaningful state regulations. But the
CUA’s omissions prompted the state legislature to enact the Medical

1. David Downs, 20 States Report Pot Legalization Measures in 2016 Election, SF GATE
(Feb. 18, 2016, 10:41 AM), http://blog.sfgate.com/smellthetruth/2016/02/18/20-states-report-potlegalization-measures-in-2016-election.
2. See 28 Legal Medical Marijuana States and DC, PROCON.ORG,
http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000881&print=true
(last
updated Dec. 28, 2016, 11:36 AM) (listing marijuana state laws along with the year in which they
were passed).
3. 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 215 (West) (codified at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 11362.5 (West 2016)).
4. Id.
5. See Tony Pugh, Medical Marijuana Industry Rapidly Grows Mainstream,
MCCLATCHYDC (Mar. 30, 2011, 7:21 PM), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nationworld/national/article24618997.html. According to one study, by 2010 nearly 80% of marijuana
consumed in the United States came from California. See id.
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Marijuana Program Act (MMPA) in 2003,6 which, among other
measures, restricted the number of plants medical marijuana patients or
designated caregivers could cultivate,7 and assigned further regulatory
authority to the Attorney General.8 Even these limits, however, became
legally ambiguous guidelines after the California Supreme Court ruled
that the rights established by constitutional amendment Proposition 215
could not be limited by legislative act.9 The upshot of these early
experiments with marijuana legalization is that California’s burgeoning
marijuana industry has been more or less unregulated for twenty years.10
In the absence of regulation, marijuana cultivation in California has
exploded, with approximately fifty thousand marijuana farms accounting
for 60% of all marijuana grown in the United States.11 There are as many
marijuana farms in Humboldt County, California, as there are wineries
statewide.12 And this unchecked growth in marijuana agriculture has
consequences for the sustainability and potential growth of the industry.
Marijuana farming has been blamed for sucking rivers dry,13 poisoning
soil and water resources with pesticides and rodenticides,14 and clearing
mature forests.15 Many of these criticisms are flawed, as research on the
6. 2003 Cal. Stat. 6422 (codified at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11362.7–.83 (West
2016)).
7. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.77.
8. Id. § 11362.77(e).
9. People v. Kelly, 222 P.3d 186, 209, 210 (Cal. 2010).
10. See Josh Harkinson, New California Laws Are a Big Deal for People Who Care
Where Their Pot Comes from, MOTHER JONES (Sept. 16, 2015, 5:00 AM),
http://www.motherjones.com/ politics/2015/09/california-medical-marijuana-bill-pot-smokersenvironment (noting California’s unique “hands-off approach”).
11. Alissa Walker, How Growing More Weed Can Help California Fix Its Water Problems,
GIZMODO (Oct. 12, 2015, 1:40 PM), http://gizmodo.com/how-growing-more-weed-can-helpcalifornia-fix-its-water-1732169259.
12. See id. (comparing the four thousand wineries in California to the four thousand pot
farms in Humboldt County).
13. See, e.g., Endangered and Threatened Species; Recovery Plans, 79 Fed. Reg. 58,750
(Sept. 30, 2014) (discussing one of the objectives of the Endangered and Threated Species
Recovery Plans “to improve degraded habitat”); Scott Bauer et al., Impacts of Surface Water
Diversions for Marijuana Cultivation on Aquatic Habitat in Four Northwestern California
Watersheds, PLOS ONE, Mar. 18, 2015, at 1, 17; Munchies Staff, Your Marijuana Habit Is Still
Sucking California Dry, VICE: MUNCHIES (Apr. 10, 2015), https://munchies.vice.com/en/articles/
your-marijuana-habit-is-still-sucking-california-dry.
14. See, e.g., Craig Thompson et al., Impacts of Rodenticide and Insecticide Toxicants from
Marijuana Cultivation Sites on Fisher Survival Rates in the Sierra National Forest, California, 7
CONSERVATION LETTERS 91, 97 (2014).
15. See, e.g., Jennifer K. Carah et al., High Time for Conservation: Adding the Environment
to the Debate on Marijuana Liberalization, 65 BIOSCIENCE 822, 824 (2015), citing Jim F.
Milestone et al., Continued Cultivation of Illegal Marijuana in U.S. Western National Parks,
Proceedings from the 2011 George Wright Society Conference on Parks, Protected Areas, and
Cultural Sites 209 (2012).
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environmental impacts of marijuana farming is nascent and rarely
acknowledges that farmers can grow responsibly and sustainably on
private lands.
Many farmers would welcome the security of compliance with state
and local laws, while being distinguished from cartel operations or
destructive “trespass grows” on public lands. As it stands, farms on
private property remain vulnerable to police raids and asset forfeiture
laws16 and are unable to take advantage of typical agricultural
government services, such as crop insurance programs or pesticide-free
certifications. Because marijuana agriculture’s regulatory contours have
remained ambiguous for so long, states and the public alike poorly
understand the marijuana agriculture industry. This disconnect presents a
threat to responsible management of legal marijuana markets.
Fortunately, change is on the horizon in California. In January 2016,
the Medical Marijuana Regulation and Safety Act (MMRSA) came into
effect,17 with ambitious proposals to create comprehensive regulations
for marijuana agriculture.18 The MMRSA assigns authority for various
regulatory responsibilities to a variety of state agencies, including the
Department of Food and Agriculture, Department of Fish and Wildlife,
Department of Public Health, and the State Water Resources Control
Board.19 Said the author of the bill, “Cultivators are going to have to
comply with the same kinds of regulations that typical farmers
do. . . . [I]t’s going to be treated like an agriculture product . . . .”20 It took
twenty years to get there, but marijuana cultivation has finally been
recognized as an agricultural activity in California, and may now be
regulated as such.21
The same cannot be said for every state that has legalized, or is
considering legalizing, medicinal or recreational marijuana. In many
states, the immediate regulatory priority is the distribution, sale, and

16. See Adrian Fernandez Baumann, A Carrot and Stick for Pot Farmers, E. BAY EXPRESS
(Aug. 12, 2015), http://www.eastbayexpress.com/oakland/a-carrot-and-stick-for-pot-farmers/
Content?oid=4454890&showFullText=true (“Asset forfeiture laws allow police to seize large
amounts of money and assets in pot busts.”).
17. 2015 Cal. Stat. 5293 (codified as amended in scattered sections of CAL. BUS. & PROF.
CODE).
18. Id.
19. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 19332 (West 2016).
20. Assemblymembers Urge Governor Brown to Sign Medical Marijuana Package, NEWS
CHANNEL 3, http://kiem-tv.com/video/assemblymembers-urge-governor-brown-sign-medicalmarijuana-package (last visited Nov. 2, 2016).
21. Patrick McGreevy, California Sets New Rules for Medical Pot Industry, L.A. TIMES
(Oct. 9, 2015, 6:09 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/political/la-me-pc-gov-brown-onmedical-marijuana-regulations-20151009-story.html.
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consumption of marijuana.22 Colorado legalized recreational marijuana
by passing Amendment 64: The Regulate Marijuana Like Alcohol Act of
2012.23 For political and public health reasons the analogy makes sense,
but it also reveals a regulatory blind spot. States may be using alcohol as
a model for regulating the distribution, retail, and consumption of
marijuana, but marijuana is much more than a retail product. It is also an
agricultural product and, by some measures, the largest cash crop in the
United States.24 Since marijuana prohibition laws were passed long
before any regulations for cultivation developed, states now face an
unprecedented challenge: to regulate, for the first time ever, one of the
country’s largest agricultural industries.
Early indications suggest that states are making little effort to regulate
marijuana cultivation, or are failing to appreciate the disruptive potential
of marijuana agriculture.25 Eight states have legalized recreational
marijuana cultivation and use. Thirteen states have legalized medical
marijuana cultivation and use.26 But few of these states are anticipating
the unique regulatory challenges that marijuana agriculture presents.
Even fewer are prepared to tackle them.
This Article argues that marijuana is a burgeoning agricultural
industry and calls for regulations that recognize it as such. As the field of
marijuana agriculture law is incipient, this Article provides a roadmap for
the major regulatory issues states and the industry are likely to encounter.
Many agricultural policies and programs are created or supported by the
federal government, and these would not apply to marijuana agricultural
activities that run afoul of federal marijuana prohibition laws. Therefore,
states and the marijuana industry will need to be creative in providing
analogous regulatory functions.
The most immediate choice regulators will have to make is between
an approach that incorporates the marijuana industry into the existing
regulatory framework for agriculture (essentially treating marijuana like
any other agricultural product), or an approach that creates a separate
regulatory framework for marijuana cultivation. While the former has its
benefits, and may be achievable long-term, marijuana’s transition from
the black market may call for a targeted regulatory scheme in the interim.

22. State Marijuana Laws Map, GOVERNING DATA, http://www.governing.com/govdata/state-marijuana-laws-map-medical-recreational.html (last updated Nov. 11, 2016).
23. 2013 Colo. Sess. Laws 3291 (codified as amended at COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16).
24. JON GETTMAN, MARIJUANA PRODUCTION IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (2006),
http://www.drugscience.org/Archive/bcr2/MJCropReport_2006.pdf.
25. See generally MARIJUANA POLICY PROJECT, STATE-BY-STATE MEDICAL MARIJUANA
LAWS (2015) (discussing an overview of state laws on marijuana from 1978 to the present).
26. State Marijuana Laws Map, supra note 22.
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Another fundamental issue facing the marijuana agriculture industry
has not yet been conclusively resolved: Is marijuana an agricultural
commodity? Commodities are fungible goods with no qualitative
differentiation, such as wheat or soybeans. Many existing farmers fear
that marijuana markets will be flooded with cheap, indistinct marijuana
grown by “Big Ag” conglomerates.27 To counteract these concerns, some
industry groups advocate for states to adopt an appellation model28 of
marijuana cultivation that would preserve markets for regional marijuana
products and maintain quality standards.29 States and counties can play a
large role in this existential question by adopting or rejecting the
appellation model, or by enacting other regulations that facilitate or
preclude the consolidation of marijuana agriculture.
The environmental component of marijuana agriculture will also
require regulatory attention. Pesticides and fertilizers facilitate plant
growth but may reduce soil and water quality.30 States and the marijuana
industry may wish to cultivate a market for organic or pesticide-free
marijuana.31 Marijuana agriculture also requires appropriate quantities of
water for irrigation and, when grown indoors, energy resources.
Regulators must balance an interest in providing resources to a growing
industry with the need to manage those resources sustainably.
When the environment does not cooperate, the federal government has
been instrumental in providing stability to the agricultural industry by
regulating crop insurance and providing disaster relief.32 As marijuana
27. Jeremy B. White, California Pot Farmers Wrestle with New Medical Marijuana Rules,
SACRAMENTO BEE (Nov. 17, 2015, 10:10 AM), http://www.sacbee.com/news/politicsgovernment/capitol-alert/article45255678.html.
28. Derived from the French term, appellation d’origine contrôlée, an appellation is a
legally protected geographic designation, known most commonly for its adoption by the wine
industry. Appellation d’Origine Contrôlée, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2011).
29. See, e.g., Anita Chabria, Why Marijuana Growers Want Champagne-Like Labels for
Their Weed, GUARDIAN (Jan. 12, 2016, 2:43 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/society/2016/
jan/12/marijuana-growers-labels-cannabis-california-legal-weed; Paul Payne, Mendocino County
Growers Plan Pot Appellations to Promote Cannabis Country, PRESS DEMOCRAT (Aug. 27,
2016), http://www.pressdemocrat.com/news/5958381-181/mendocino-county-growers-plan-pot
?artslide=0.
30. See Wasim Aktar et al., Impact of Pesticides use in Agriculture: Their Benefits and
Hazards, 2 INTERDISC. TOXICOLOGY 1, 8 (2009); James Stephen Carpenter, Farm Chemicals, Soil
Erosion and Sustainable Agriculture, 13 STAN. ENVT’L L.J. 190, 198, 201 (1994).
31. See, e.g., Rachel E. Gross, Why Is It So Hard to Get Clean Weed?, SLATE
(Apr. 20, 2016, 11:54 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2016/04/there_
s_a_clean_natural_weed_movement_but_it_can_t_call_itself_organic_here.html; Susan Squibb,
Desperately Seeking Outdoor-Grown, Organic Colorado Marijuana, CANNABIST (Jan. 4, 2016,
6:09 PM), http://www.thecannabist.co/2016/01/04/organic-marijuana-outdoor-pesticides/38301.
32. Federal Disaster Assistance & Crop Insurance Programs: An Overview, NAT’L AGRIC.
L. CTR., http://nationalaglawcenter.org/overview/disasterassistancecropinsurance (last updated
Jan. 23, 2014); see, e.g., What Is the Role of the Federal Government in Crop Insurance?,
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farmers would not be eligible for these programs, states may want to
provide their own support structures. However, it may be difficult to
avoid the federal government’s institutional and legal reach, presenting
federal preemption concerns.
Another question concerns power sharing: Where can (or should)
regulatory authority be placed? Local governments may play a large role
in the direction of marijuana agriculture, as states with marijuana
regulations have so far been broadly permissive of counties and
municipalities creating their own (often more restrictive) marijuana
agriculture regulations.33 Local governments can utilize their lawmaking
powers to shape agricultural policy for the marijuana industry, but this
decentralized form of policy making may come at the expense of
regulatory clarity for the state as a whole.
Keeping the regulatory framework centralized on the state level
provides more consistency but may be difficult to apply in states where
political support for marijuana cultivation changes drastically by
jurisdiction. In addition, states will need to decide whether to consolidate
regulatory authority for marijuana into one state agency, or to assign
different roles and responsibilities to several agencies and regulate
cooperatively. Colorado has adopted the former model,34 while
California has adopted the latter.35
In February 2016, Humboldt County passed a comprehensive
commercial marijuana cultivation ordinance,36 one of the first of its kind.
As the heart and soul of California’s marijuana agriculture sector,
Humboldt County has consistently played a leadership role in the
development of the marijuana industry, and this ordinance may prove
instrumental in shaping marijuana agriculture policies around the
country. The ordinance addresses many of the issues identified in this
Article, placing limits on farm size, water, and energy use, while
developing an artisanal labelling program.37 The Humboldt County
ordinance is an ideal case study for the nascent field of marijuana
agriculture law and underscores the need for state and local governments
across the nation to start developing their own regulatory framework.
Never before has a major agricultural product entered legal markets
with the pace and scale that marijuana is entering them today. States face
CROP INS., http://www.cropinsuranceinamerica.org/just-the-facts/what-is-the-role-of-the-federalgovernment-in-the-crop-insurance-program/#.V-n6zmO_tFJ (last visited Jan. 20, 2017).
33. See, e.g., BUTTE, CAL., CODE ch. 34A (2017).
34. See, e.g., PUEBLO, COLO., CODE ch. 5.12, § 5.12.030 (2013) (“[T]he Pueblo County
Liquor and Marijuana Licensing Board shall have the power and authority to suspend, fine, restrict
or revoke [marijuana] licenses . . . .”).
35. See, e.g., KERN, CAL., CODE ch. 5.85, § 5.85.030 (2016) (discussing relationships to
other laws).
36. HUMBOLDT, CAL., CODE tit. III, div. 1, ch. 3, § 313-55.4 (2016).
37. Id.
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an unprecedented regulatory challenge, and ignoring the agricultural
dimension of the marijuana industry is not a sound long-term approach.
This Article will present and analyze the most significant legal and
regulatory challenges states will face when legalizing marijuana.
Responsible and sustainable marijuana agriculture can be fostered at the
state level, but only if regulations are responsive to the unique and
unprecedented challenges that marijuana agriculture presents.
I. THERE AND BACK AGAIN: MARIJUANA’S LONG ROAD TO REGULATED
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCT
Marijuana is one of humanity’s oldest cultivated crops. It can be
traced back 12,000 years to hunter-gatherers who appreciated its
nutritious and psychoactive properties.38 In Neolithic times it traveled
from its roots in China and Siberia along the Silk Road to the Middle East
and Europe,39 and, once established, it flourished in classical Greek,
Roman, and Arab societies.40 European colonists spread marijuana
cultivation, trade, and use throughout the Western Hemisphere and into
what is now the United States.41
For many years, marijuana’s presence in the United States was
overshadowed by the other major derivative of its taxonomic species
cannabis sativa: hemp.42 Marijuana is primarily grown and used for its
medicinal or recreational psychoactive properties. Hemp strains,
however, are grown to produce food, textiles, paper, and other
materials.43 Queen Elizabeth required large landowners throughout the
British Empire to grow hemp to counter Britain’s reliance on Russian
hemp imports;44 later the Jamestown colonists would be required to do
the same.45 Both George Washington and Thomas Jefferson were hemp
38. Barney Warf, High Points: An Historical Geography of Cannabis, 104 GEOGRAPHICAL
REV. 414, 418í19 (2014).
39. Id. at 420.
40. Id. at 423.
41. Id. at 425–26.
42. For a review of the taxonomy of marijuana and hemp, see generally Shannon L.
Datwyler & George D. Weiblen, Genetic Variation in Hemp and Marijuana (Cannabis Sativa L.)
According to Amplified Fragment Length Polymorphisms, 51 J. FORENSIC SCI. 371 (2006); Ernest
Small & Arthur Cronquist, A Practical and Natural Taxonomy for Cannabis, 25 TAXON 405
(1976).
43. See generally ROWAN ROBINSON, THE GREAT BOOK OF HEMP: THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO
THE ENVIRONMENTAL, COMMERCIAL, AND MEDICINAL USES OF THE WORLD’S MOST
EXTRAORDINARY PLANT (1996) (describing the development of a modern industrial hemp industry
and the various uses of hemp therein).
44. Warf, supra note 38, at 426.
45. MARTIN A. LEE, SMOKE SIGNALS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF MARIJUANA—MEDICAL,
RECREATIONAL AND SCIENTIFIC 16 (2012).
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growers, and a draft of the Declaration of Independence was written on
hemp.46 John Adams was a prominent supporter of hemp cultivation,
writing frequently about its benefits.47 “Seems to me if grate Men dont
leeve off writing Pollyticks, breaking Heads, boxing Ears, ringing Noses
and kicking Breeches, we shall by and by want a world of Hemp more
for our own consumshon,” Adams wrote.48
Hemp and marijuana would continue to be grown throughout the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.49 Like any other legal
agricultural commodity, marijuana would have been subject to variations
in state agricultural laws and policies.50 In jurisdictions east of the
Mississippi River, for example, marijuana cultivation would have been
permitted as long as it was reasonable vis a vis other riparians.51 The fact
that a water rights dispute before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in
1852 involved a contractual obligation to use water solely for certain
purposes that included a hemp-mill was found unremarkable by the
court.52
In western states, marijuana cultivation—perceived as agriculture—
would have met the requirements of beneficial use, thereby vesting water
rights in accordance with temporal seniority. An early Colorado case
establishing the prior appropriation doctrine noted the “necessity for
artificial irrigation of the soil.”53 In 1947, a California tax dispute
involved the development of wells for purposes of irrigating hemp.54 The
court thought the plan could “prove a profitable industry,” before moving
on to the legal matter at issue.55
Eventually the politicization of marijuana, as well as the widespread
use of both hemp and marijuana in the United States catalyzed opposition
to cannabis sativa’s legality from multiple angles. On the one hand,
marijuana’s early popularity with immigrants and bohemian communities
produced reactionary prejudices that prompted crude public campaigns

46. Id. at 16, 18.
47. Corliss Knapp Engle, John Adams, Farmer and Gardener, ARNOLDIA, 2002, at 9, 10.
48. Letter from Humphrey Ploughjogger to the Boston Evening-Post (June 20, 1763), in 1
PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 63, 66 (Robert J. Taylor et al. eds., 1977).
49. By some accounts, it became the third largest cash crop in the United States by the midnineteenth century. LEE, supra note 45, at 19.
50. See Production Contracts, NAT’L AGRIC. L. CTR., http://nationalaglawcenter.org/
research-by-topic/production-contracts (last visited Jan. 2, 2017).
51. E.g., Hendrick v. Cook, 4 Ga. 241, 256 (1848) (“Each riparian proprietor is entitled to
a reasonable use of the water, for domestic, agricultural and manufacturing purposes . . . .”).
52. See Washabaugh v. Oyster, 18 Pa. 497, 498 (1852).
53. Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 449 (1882).
54. Lerdo Land Co. v. Comm’r, 6 T.C.M. 1285 (1947).
55. Id.
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to criminalize the drug.56 On the other hand, hemp’s industrial versatility
was a threat to the cotton industry and other producers of textiles.57
Despite strong support in the medical and pharmaceutical industries (the
agriculture industry was less supportive), twenty-nine states banned
cannabis between 1915 and 1931.58
The federal government then passed the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,59
creating barriers to marijuana production, sale, and consumption.60 The
Supreme Court’s ruling in Leary v. United States61 overturned the
Marihuana Tax Act on the grounds that compliance would violate a
person’s right against self-incrimination.62 But the decision prompted
Congress to repeal the Act and replace it with the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970,63 which categorized
marijuana as a Schedule I narcotic with prohibitions on cultivation, sale,
possession, and use.64 Cannabis (including marijuana and hemp) has been
a black market crop ever since.
Because states developed modern regulatory regimes in the latter half
of the twentieth century (after marijuana was criminalized),65 those
regimes have never regulated the marijuana industry. This is true of many
agricultural laws and policies as well, which federal agricultural policy
has traditionally dictated or influenced. Until the Dust Bowl of the 1930s
ravaged farming communities, the federal government’s role in
agriculture was minimal;66 if droughts or crop failures caused farmland
to become unusable, farmers were forced to relocate without any type of

56. Warf, supra note 38, at 429; see also TELL YOUR CHILDREN (G and H Productions 1936)
(depicting the graphic horrors of marijuana use in ways that would appear satirical today).
57. See Warf, supra note 38, at 429.
58. Collin B. Walsh & Daniel T. Nau, The History, Law, and Psychology of Criminalizing
Marijuana: A Comparative Analysis with Alcohol and Tobacco 19 (Ind. Univ. Maurer Sch. of
Law, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 274, 2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2355151##.
59. Pub. L. No. 75-238, 50 Stat. 551 (1937), repealed by Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236.
60. Id.
61. 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
62. Id. at 13.
63. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2012)).
64. Id.; Walsh & Nau, supra note 58, at 23.
65. See Ryan Stoa, Florida Water Management Districts and the Florida Water Resources
Act: The Challenges of Basin-Level Management, 7 KY. J. EQUINE AGRIC. & NAT. RES. L. 73, 79
(2015) (describing how the spread of environmental awareness led to the passing of four major
pieces of legislation in the 1960s).
66. See Zeynep K. Hansen & Gary D. Libecap, Small Farms, Externalities, and the Dust
Bowl of the 1930s, 112 J. POL. ECON. 665, 666, 684 (2004) (discussing the disastrous
consequences of the Dust Bowl and the eventual government intervention in the late 1930s).
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federal assistance.67 The Dust Bowl marked a turning point as the public
recognized the vital role agriculturalists played in providing food supply.
New Deal policies created agricultural programs designed to minimize
risk for farmers, including subsidized feed, subsidized crop insurance,
and financial aid grants.68 The federal government also intervened in
commodity markets to stabilize supply and demand. Successive
Agricultural Adjustment Acts69 provided grants that incentivized
agricultural development in arid regions with the knowledge that
government-backed insurance programs would spread the risk across
society.70 These policies were not just meant to protect farmers—they
were designed to prop up entire farming communities.71
Post-World War II policies created general disaster relief funding
frameworks, in which governors can request, and the President can grant,
disaster assistance.72 In the 1970s, the federal government encouraged
large-scale consolidation of small farms into large agribusinesses, while
maintaining subsidies, to dramatically increase yields and promote
agricultural exports.73 For the most part, the pillars of agricultural law and
policy set in motion in the twentieth century—crop subsidies,
government-backed insurance, and direct relief payments—are still in
place today.74 Needless to say, the marijuana industry was not swept up
67. See Robert W. Adler, Balancing Compassion and Risk in Climate Adaptation: U.S.
Water, Drought, and Agricultural Law, 64 FLA. L. REV. 201, 245–46 (2012).
68. Id. at 247.
69. E.g., Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-10, 48 Stat. 31, invalidated
by United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936); Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, Pub. L. No.
108-357, 52 Stat. 31 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1281–1407 (2012)).
70. See Adler, supra note 67, at 250.
71. Id. at 253.
72. See, e.g., Federal Disaster Relief Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-875, 64 Stat. 1109
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5121 (1995)); see also Joanna M. Foster, Oregon,
Washington Declare States of Emergency as Wildfires Spread, THINKPROGRESS (July 17, 2014),
https://thinkprogress.org/oregon-washington-declare-states-of-emergency-as-wildfires-spread-a
afd1a2fee09#.m7eiipg55 (reporting that the federal government has sent the National Guard and
the National Weather Service to assist states with wildfire problems); Ian Lovett, California
Approves Forceful Steps amid Drought, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/07/16/us/forceful-steps-amid-a-severe-drought.html?_r=0 (showing an example of
California legislators approving regulation as assistance for droughts).
73. Adler, supra note 67, at 260.
74. The Agricultural Act of 2014, which establishes agricultural spending for the next ten
years, allocates $44.4 billion for commodity programs and $90 billion for crop insurance. The
government distributed disaster relief funds a week after the Act was signed into law, including
$100 million for livestock losses in California. Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-79, 128
Stat. 649 (to be codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.); News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Agric.,
Obama Administration Announces Additional Assistance to Californians Impacted by Drought
(Feb. 14, 2014), http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?contentidonly=true&contentid
=2014/02/0022.xml; Brad Plumer, The $956 Billion Farm Bill, in One Graph, WASH. POST (Jan.
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in these initiatives. For the most part, marijuana cultivation in the United
States for much of the twentieth century was conducted by small-scale
farmers acting independently (or, more accurately, in violation) of state
and federal agricultural policies.
If this assortment of agricultural policies had developed in the
presence of a legal marijuana industry, there is little reason to believe
marijuana cultivation would have been any more challenging than the
regulation of other crops. Regulation by federal agencies like the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA)75 and the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA)76 would have been likely, while states may or may
not have developed marijuana-specific agricultural policies.77
Preliminary marijuana legalization initiatives have forced agencies to
consider the marijuana industry anew, but those efforts remain limited.
A. Marijuana Cultivation Is an Unregulated Agricultural Activity
To determine how marijuana will fit into modern regulatory regimes,
it is necessary to understand how the marijuana industry has evolved on
the black market. The size of the marijuana industry today, like any
rooted (at least in part) in the black market, is notoriously difficult to
estimate, and there is a lack of peer-reviewed research. A 2006 promarijuana study focused on valuation pegged the total value of domestic
marijuana production at $35.8 billion.78 If the estimate is accurate,
marijuana would be the largest cash crop in the United States and a top
five cash crop in 39 states.79 In 2012 a generalist book on legalization
questioned those results, claiming the industry production value is closer
28, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/01/28/the-950-billion-farmbill-in-one-chart.
75. The FDA regulates prescription and pharmaceutical drugs, among other products
affecting public health. See, e.g., Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75717, 52 Stat. 1040 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–99 (2012)).
76. The USDA provides “leadership on food, agriculture, natural resources, rural
development, nutrition, and related issues based on public policy, the best available science, and
efficient management.” About the U.S. Department of Agriculture, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC.,
http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?navtype=MA&navid=ABOUT_USDA
(last
modified Oct. 6, 2016).
77. In regulated riparian jurisdictions, agencies can issue permits, or legislatures can craft
laws, in a manner that prefers one use over another, or in some cases, one crop over another. The
Regulated Riparian Model Water Code, for example, proscribes the following preferences among
water rights: (1) water for human health; (2) water to protect crops and livestock; and (3) all other
uses. The latitude agencies and legislatures have to interpret what is a “reasonable use,” which
may facilitate agricultural favoritism. In Florida, for example, the influence of the citrus industry
has strained efforts to protect the Everglades. See Stoa, supra note 65, at 83–85.
78. See GETTMAN, supra note 24, app. 3b, at 24. The $35.8 billion figure is based on an
estimate of over 56 million plants grown annually.
79. See id. at 13 & tbl. 7.
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to $4.3 billion.80 A 2016 study on the nascent legal marijuana market was
more bullish, finding annual sales of legal products topping $2.7 billion
and growth outpacing any other industry.81
As the marijuana industry matures and a greater proportion of its
economic activities take place in legal markets, more precise estimates
will become available. For now, even low estimates make clear that the
transition from black market to legalized and regulated cultivation will
transfer a burgeoning agricultural industry into regulatory systems. This
transfer will not occur all at once. Aggressive taxation of producers and
consumers of marijuana may keep less expensive black market
opportunities alive and well.82 In Colorado’s legal marijuana market, an
estimated 40% of consumers still purchase marijuana on the black
market, likely due to lower prices.83 While that may be a disappointment
to law enforcement and tax revenue authorities, administrative agencies
may benefit from a gradual transition to legalization. And if obtaining the
necessary agricultural permits is perceived to be excessively onerous by
farmers, regulations may themselves contribute to the perpetuation of the
black market.
What is clear is that marijuana cultivation is an agricultural activity.
Marijuana can be grown in many different ways, in many different places,
under many different growing conditions.84 It can be grown indoors or
outdoors, in arid or humid climates, with rain-fed or irrigated water.85
Cultivation sites range from one or two plants grown for personal use, to
small-scale farms, to large-scale “trespass” grows on public lands.86
80. JONATHAN P. CAULKINS ET AL., MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION 41 (2012); see Michael
Montgomery, Cal. Watch, Marijuana Not Top U.S. Cash Crop: Book, NBC BAY AREA (Aug. 14,
2012, 6:14 AM), http://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/New_book_discounts_theory_of_
marijuana_as_top_US_cash_crop-166081066.html.
81. Jeff Daniels, There’s a New Gold Rush in California as Investors Prep for Pot
Legalization Vote, CNBC (June 30, 2016, 11:07 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/06/30/theresa-new-gold-rush-in-california-as-investors-prep-for-pot-legalization-vote.html.
82. See Robert W. Wood, Feds Propose Taxing Marijuana, True Cash Crop, FORBES (Dec.
10, 2014, 1:41 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2014/12/10/feds-propose-taxingmarijuana-true-cash-crop/#164a628c35f6. But see JANE G. GRAVELLE & SEAN LOWRY, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R43785, FEDERAL PROPOSALS TO TAX MARIJUANA: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 18
(2014), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43785.pdf (“[T]he initial tax rate for legalized
marijuana could be set low enough to undermine the illicit market . . . .”).
83. See Katie Lobosco, Colorado’s Missing Marijuana Taxes, CNN MONEY (Sept. 2, 2014,
8:01 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/09/02/news/economy/marijuana-taxes-colorado/index.
html?section=money_topstories.
84. ROBERT CONNELL CLARKE, MARIJUANA BOTANY app. II, at 162–63 (1981).
85. Id.
86. See Phillip Smith, Federal Bill Would Up Penalties for Marijuana “Trespass Grows,”
STOPTHEDRUGWAR.ORG (July 19, 2013, 5:10 PM), http://stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle/2013/jul/
19/federal_bill_would_penalties_mar.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol69/iss2/1

14

Stoa: Marijuana Agriculture Law: Regulation At The Root Of An Industry

2017]

MARIJUANA AGRICULTURE LAW: REGULATION AT THE ROOT OF AN INDUSTRY

311

Some envision a future dominated by large consolidated farms producing
generic marijuana. Because the marijuana industry is so fragmented and
diverse, it is difficult to paint a picture of marijuana farming that is
representative of the diversity of cultivation methods.
Fundamentally, however, marijuana is a plant that must be cultivated
to produce a market value. Marijuana buds (used to create marijuana
products) can only be produced when female marijuana plants have not
been pollenated by male plants, an exceedingly unlikely scenario in the
wild.87 To provide marijuana products to markets (legal or otherwise),
therefore, requires human intervention and agricultural activity. This is
an aspect of the marijuana industry, however, that many states have not
fully appreciated. For twenty years after the state of California legalized
medicinal marijuana, the state, to the extent it regulated the marijuana
industry at all, focused mainly on regulating physicians, patients, and
dispensaries.88 The state acted as if marijuana appeared out of thin air. Or
perhaps, the state’s regulatory priorities suggested that marijuana
agriculture did not need regulation.
Some states that have legalized the medicinal or recreational use of
marijuana more recently have shown greater awareness of the agricultural
component of the marijuana industry, but so far regulations have been
limited relative to the scope of issues identified in this Article, or in some
cases, non-existent. In New York, the approach has been dismissive of
the agricultural component of the marijuana industry. While the state
passed the Compassionate Care Act legalizing medicinal marijuana in
2014,89 the law only allowed for five cultivators state-wide.90 The law
seemingly rejects the concept of marijuana agriculture altogether,
referring to the process of growing marijuana plants as
“manufacturing.”91 To the extent the law addresses marijuana
87. See Ernest Small & Steve G. U. Naraine, Expansion of Female Sex Organs in Response
to Prolonged Virginity in Cannabis Sativa (Marijuana), 63 GENETIC RESOURCES & CROP
EVOLUTION 339, 346 (2016).
88. See STEPHEN A. MCEWEN, LEAGUE OF CAL. CITIES, MEDICAL MARIJUANA—REVISITED
AFTER NEW STATE LAWS (2016), https://www.cacities.org/Resources-Documents/MemberEngagement/Professional-Departments/City-Attorneys/Library/2016/Spring-2016/5-2016-SpringMedical-Marijuana-%E2%80%93-Revisited-After.aspx.
89. 2014 N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 90 (McKinney) (codified at N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 3360–
69 (McKinney 2014)).
90. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3365(9); see also Jesse McKinley, New York State Awards 5
Medical Marijuana Licenses, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/
08/01/nyregion/new-york-state-awards-5-medical-marijuana-licenses.html?_r=0 (discussing the
companies now allowed to grow and sell medicinal marijuana in New York).
91. The bill’s summary begins, “Relates to the medical use of marihuana; legalizes the
possession, manufacture, use, delivery, transport or administration of medical marihuana by a
designated caregiver for a certified medical use . . . .” Summary, A.B. A06357, 2013–14 Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2014).
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manufacturing at all, it requires that plants be grown indoors.92 This
approach is flawed in several respects, as it pays little attention to the
cultivation stage marijuana products must go through.
Other states have been more realistic about issues surrounding
marijuana agriculture, though many blind spots remain. Licensing
producers has been a common feature of these regulatory frameworks,
and the licensing process may address agricultural issues, but often the
focus has been limited to pesticide use, cultivation limits, or labelling.93
In Colorado, for example, a task force established to investigate legal and
regulatory issues and propose legislative and executive actions
appropriately identified some agricultural issues,94 such as the need to
regulate pesticides and waste products, tax cultivators, and establish
cultivation limits,95 but broader issues central to agricultural development
(such as water use or permitted cultivation practices) were not addressed.
While states appear to be aware that the marijuana industry is
predicated on the cultivation of marijuana plants, the early record of
marijuana regulations suggests that most states are ill-equipped to address
marijuana agriculture. That may be due to a lack of institutional
knowledge on the part of policy makers, which is understandable, but that
does not excuse states that do not attempt to identify agricultural issues
in the marijuana industry or develop a regulatory response.
B. Tailored Regulations vs. Equal Treatment
If there has been a trend in marijuana regulation among states that
have legalized the medicinal or recreational use of marijuana, it has been
to either reject that marijuana cultivation constitutes agriculture in the
first place (as in New York),96 or to license cultivators without also
creating a broader marijuana agriculture regulation framework (as in
Colorado).97 California has been the only state to acknowledge that
marijuana cultivation is an agricultural activity and that it requires
92. “Manufacturing of medical marihuana by a registered organization shall only be done
in an indoor, enclosed, secure facility located in New York state, which may include a
greenhouse.” N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3364(8).
93. See, e.g., Bryce Pardo, Cannabis Policy Reforms in the Americas: A Comparative
Analysis of Colorado, Washington, and Uruguay, 25 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 727, 731 (2014).
94. COLO. TASK FORCE, REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AMENDMENT 64, at 66–68
(2013), http://www.colorado.gov/cms/forms/dor-tax/A64TaskForceFinalReport.pdf.
95. Pardo, supra note 93, at 731–32. The task force’s recommendations were largely
adopted by the state legislature and passed in May 2013. See H.B. 13-1317, 69th Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2013).
96. See supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text (discussing New York’s use of
“manufacture” instead of a word that represents cultivation or the growing of marijuana).
97. See supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text (discussing the failure of Colorado
regulatory regimes to create a broad regulatory framework).
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agricultural regulations.98 As marijuana regulations are generally in their
infancy, it is difficult to judge the validity of these approaches. One of
these difficulties is that few crops share the same biological
characteristics or legal history as marijuana, so states are starting from
scratch in their regulatory efforts. But these regulatory struggles raise a
broader question: Do states need to develop a regulatory framework
tailored for marijuana agriculture? Perhaps, instead, it would be
expedient to regulate marijuana like any other crop, using established
state agricultural policies and institutions.
Treating marijuana like any other legal agricultural product has some
advantages. Most states already have extensive regulations in place to
address farm business organizations; commercial transactions; crop
insurance; agricultural estate planning; agricultural financing and
taxation; product safety, storage, and labelling; agricultural workers and
labor standards; land use and areas zoned for agriculture; and
environmental challenges such as water use, pesticides, fertilizers, and
agricultural runoff.99 Some adjustments would be necessary, of course, to
integrate marijuana agriculture into these frameworks, especially when
state regulations are intimately connected with federal agricultural laws
and policies. But it would not be excessively burdensome for state
agencies addressing these components of the agriculture industry to make
the necessary adjustments upon legalization and regulate marijuana
comparably to other crops. Similarly, a farmer growing several crops will
already be accustomed to those rules and regulations, and it would not be
impractical for that farmer to incorporate marijuana into their crop
portfolio and resume business as usual.
It may be that, in several years or decades, marijuana is regulated like
other crops. It seems unlikely that New York will continue to restrict
marijuana cultivation to a small group of five “manufacturers,” for
example. At least initially, however, as states transition to a legal
marijuana market, existing frameworks likely cannot accommodate
marijuana without creating significant regulatory disruptions. As a
preliminary matter, there is insufficient political will to legalize
marijuana and treat it like other crops. Because so much regulatory
attention focuses on where and how marijuana is sold, purchased, and
consumed, naturally regulators have included marijuana cultivation in
their tailored regulatory frameworks to maintain oversight of the supply
chain.100 While that has not induced regulators to consider the full
98. A.B. 243, 2015–2016 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015).
99. The National Agricultural Law Center compiles an index of publications on these and
other topics pertinent to the regulation of agriculture. See Research Articles, NAT’L AGRIC. L.
CTR., http://nationalaglawcenter.org/center-publications (last visited Mar. 28, 2016).
100. In some cases, the impulse to maintain oversight has prompted states to require vertical
integration of the supply chain. See discussion infra Section II.C.
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spectrum of marijuana-related agricultural issues, it has removed
marijuana cultivation from the usual regulatory process.
In addition, where states have restricted the number of farmers
cultivating marijuana, or the amount of marijuana that each farmer may
cultivate, they have done so in part to restrict the size of the legal
marijuana market. This may not affect the size of the overall marijuana
market—including the black market—and in that respect states may be
losing out on tax revenues,101 but the objective is not without merit. The
marijuana industry is large and unwieldy, and regulating the industry
without help from the federal government is a heavy burden for state
agencies. In fact, Colorado’s neighboring states have argued to the U.S.
Supreme Court that Colorado’s legal marijuana products have placed
undue stress on their own state agencies.102 It is not unreasonable that
states would seek to gradually incorporate marijuana into their regulatory
frameworks, and doing so may require tailored regulations that remove
marijuana from established agricultural regulations.
Beyond this pragmatic concern, it may not be in the interest of the
marijuana industry, or the individual states and their marijuana farming
communities, to treat marijuana indifferently. As discussed below, an
unrestricted approach may lead to the commoditization of marijuana and
consolidation of marijuana farms.103 Additionally, because marijuana has
been a black market agricultural product for decades, it does not enter
legal frameworks looking like a traditional agricultural product. Many
marijuana farmers grow their plants indoors, for example, instead of in
outdoor fields.104
Moreover, many farmers that cultivate marijuana on the black market
are not subject to any agricultural rules and regulations. They may not,
for example, have valid water rights,105 land zoned for agriculture,106 or
a sophisticated understanding of administrative law and the permitting
process.107 Subjecting these farmers to the weight of existing regulations
overnight is within a state’s administrative powers, but that approach may
come at the cost of alienating those farmers and discouraging them from
participating in the legal system, perpetuating a robust black-market
101. See Lobosco, supra note 83.
102. Complaint at 3–4, Nebraska v. Colorado, 136 S. Ct. 1034 (2016) (No. 144). The
Supreme Court declined to hear the case. Nebraska, 136 S. Ct. at 1034.
103. See discussion infra Section II.A.
104. Indoor growing offers many advantages such as controlled climate, environment, and
light. ROBERT BERGMAN, THE MARIJUANA GROW BIBLE ch. 2 (2014) (ebook),
http://www.ilovegrowingmarijuana.com/wp-content/uploads/guides/Ilovegrowingmarijuana.comgrow-bible.pdf.
105. See discussion infra Section III.A.
106. See infra note 276 and accompanying text (discussing the custom of growing indoors
as a result of prohibition).
107. See infra note 197 and accompanying text.
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farming community. If states are to incentivize participation from
existing marijuana farmers—while creating a framework for marijuana
agriculture that is responsive to the best interests of states, farming
communities, and the marijuana industry—a tailored approach that
provides a gradual transition into existing agricultural regulation
frameworks may be necessary.
II. THE MARIJUANA FRAGMENTATION SPECTRUM: COMMODITIZATION,
INTEGRATION, OR APPELLATION?
In 2010, California voters decisively rejected Proposition 19 (the
Regulate, Control, and Tax Cannabis Act), a measure that would have
legalized recreational marijuana and commercial cultivation.108 The usual
arguments against legalization were made by advocates skeptical of the
marijuana industry, who were concerned about marijuana’s impact on
public health and safety109 or the inherent regulatory and enforcement
challenges marijuana legalization presents.110
What came as a surprise to many, however, was an apparent lack of
support for legalization from marijuana farming strongholds. In the socalled “Emerald Triangle” of Mendocino County, Trinity County, and
108. Accord California Proposition 19, the Marijuana Legalization Initiative (2010),
BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_19,_the_Marijuana_ Legalization_
Initiative_(2010) (last visited Dec. 19, 2016).
109. The Monterey County Herald wrote:
[W]e fear that a California-only pot industry operating under inconsistent and
even contradictory rules would create serious crime problems of its own.
Proposition 19 doesn't set a measurable standard for driving under the influence
of marijuana, and it could make it much more difficult for employers to bar
employees from using marijuana even if it might undermine their ability to work
safely.
Editorial, Legalized Marijuana Measure Proposition 19 Is the Right Idea, but the Wrong Law,
MONTEREY CTY. HERALD (Sept. 29, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://www.montereyherald.com/generalnews/20100929/editorial-legalized-marijuana-measure-proposition-19-is-the-right-idea-but-thewrong-law.
110. The Santa Rosa Press Democrat wrote:
Proposition 19 is so poorly worded and filled with loopholes that it’s likely to
create more confusion than clarity. And, as with Proposition 215, which legalized
medicinal uses of marijuana, it would still leave California law in conflict with
federal law, creating more regulatory and policy gridlock at all levels of
government.
Pot Measure Is Poorly Worded and Potentially Dangerous, PRESS DEMOCRAT (Sept. 27, 2010),
http://www.pressdemocrat.com/csp/mediapool/sites/PressDemocrat/News/story.csp?cid=224694
2&sid=555&fid=181.
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Humboldt County—jurisdictions whose economics are dominated by
marijuana cultivation—voters were even less enthusiastic about
Proposition 19 than the state as a whole.111 In Trinity County, barely 40%
of voters supported the measure.112 The simple narrative that emerged
was that marijuana farmers were driven by greed: The price of marijuana,
after all, is inflated on the black market, and having been successful
operating in the shadows for so long, these farmers were perfectly happy
to maintain the prohibition status quo.113
The narrative was misleading but not altogether unfounded. Just as
many legalization opponents voiced concerns that Proposition 19 was
vague and would prove difficult to enforce,114 some marijuana farmers
were concerned that ambiguously worded legalization would lead to a
proliferation of marijuana conglomerates akin to the tobacco industry.115
Mass production of marijuana on this scale would threaten to drive out
California’s fifty thousand marijuana farms116 and replace them with Big
Ag producers.117
As California prepared to vote on another marijuana legalization
measure in November 2016—the Adult Use of Marijuana Act118—
marijuana farmers remained skeptical.119 Fearing the initiative and its
financial backers are likely to push for commoditization of the marijuana
111. Prop. 19: Election Results by County, FRESNO CANNABIS ASS’N,
http://fresnocannabis.org/prop-19-election-results-by-county (last visited Dec. 19, 2016).
112. Id.
113. See Thadeus Greenson, Up in Smoke: A Closer Look at How Humboldt Voters Shot
Down Proposition 19, TIMES-STANDARD (Dec. 9, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://www.timesstandard.com/article/ZZ/20101209/NEWS/101209406.
114. See supra note 110.
115. Phil Willon, Only One of California’s Pot Legalization Initiatives Has the Green That
Counts, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2016, 12:05 AM), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-camarijuana-legalization-california-ballot-20160222-story.html.
116. Kate Maxwell, Cannabis Now Considered Agriculture, WILLITZ NEWS (Feb. 10, 2016),
http://www.willitsnews.com/article/NR/20160210/NEWS/160219981.
117. See Rory Carroll, California Marijuana Legalization Faces Unlikely Foe: Growers,
REUTERS (Oct. 4, 2016, 4:49 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-marijuana-growersidUSKCN1240AF.
118. 2016 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 64 (West) (to be codified in scattered sections of CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE).
119. See, e.g., Willon, supra note 115.
Hezekiah Allen of the California Growers Assn., which represents growers and
other businesses in the cannabis industry, fears the interests influencing this vote
could wipe out California's small marijuana operations and lead to “big
marijuana” companies akin to the nation's powerful tobacco giants.
“We don’t want there to be a Philip Morris of marijuana,” he said.
Id.
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industry, support for the initiative remains lukewarm.120 The existential
struggle exposes one of the most fundamental questions facing the
marijuana industry: Should states regulate to protect small-scale
marijuana farmers or allow the industry to consolidate and commoditize?
On one end of the spectrum, the marijuana industry becomes like the wine
industry: driven by geography and protected by appellation designations.
On the other end, marijuana becomes an agricultural commodity:
indistinct and inexpensive. Contrary to the views of many
prognosticators,121 the eventual consolidation of the marijuana industry
is not a foregone conclusion. In this matter, states and local governments
have a choice to make.
A. Marijuana as Agricultural Commodity
Agricultural commodities are agricultural products that have no
qualitative differentiation in the marketplace.122 They are fungible and
treated equally with little regard for where, how, or by whom they were
produced. As economist Karl Marx wrote, “From the taste of wheat it is
not possible to tell who produced it, a Russian serf, a French peasant or
an English capitalist.”123 Commodities are not differentiated by brand,
quality (or perceived quality), or sustainability of production. Besides
wheat, other examples include tobacco, rye, barley, oats, cotton,
soybeans, and rice.124 The commoditization of agricultural products
allows them to be mass-produced and widely available, increasing supply
and driving down prices for consumers.125 On the other hand, by making
products uniform, commoditization makes it difficult for producers and
consumers to create a market for unique products.126
The transition from a differentiated product to an undifferentiated
product is not black and white, because some products retain niche
120. Id.
121. The Economist’s February 13, 2016 cover story on marijuana regulation finds the
emergence of large-scale agricultural companies and consolidation of the industry likely.
Legalising Cannabis: Reeferegulatory Challenge, ECONOMIST (Feb. 13, 2016),
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21692873-growing-number-countries-are-decidingditch-prohibition-what-comes.
122. For a list of agricultural commodities defined in the U.S. Code, see 7 U.S.C. § 1518
(2012).
123. KARL MARX, A CONTRIBUTION TO THE CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (1859),
reprinted in 29 COLLECTED WORKS OF MARX AND ENGELS 257, 270 (2010) (ebook).
124. 7 U.S.C. § 1518.
125. Commoditize, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/commoditize.asp
(last visited Dec. 21, 2016).
126. See Martin Rapaport, Op-ed, Commoditization: Diamond Industry to Establish Fair,
Open, Competitive Markets, RAPAPORT MAG. (July 2007), http://www.diamonds.net/Magazine/
Article.aspx?ArticleID=18283&RDRIssueID=12.
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markets with unique characteristics, and regulations can intervene to
create unique markets or prevent products from becoming commodities
altogether. Eggs, for example, may be somewhere in the middle: some
consumers view them as fungible and reach for the cheapest eggs
available,127 while other consumers pay more for eggs produced
sustainably or ethically.128 States can create parallel markets by
establishing regulations that impose certain requirements on otherwise
fungible products. California, for example, requires all eggs sold in the
state to be laid by hens raised in adequately large pens.129 In the most
aggressive cases, jurisdictions create appellations for agricultural
products (such as wine or cheese), providing a protected indication based
on where or how the product was created.130
The conventional wisdom is that absent regulation, the marijuana
industry will come to be dominated by large-scale, mass-produced
marijuana farms that flood the market with marijuana and drive down
prices.131 As prices drop, small-scale farming will become unprofitable,
leading the industry to consolidate into fewer farms cultivating larger
quantities of marijuana. The U.S. tobacco farming industry has
experienced a similar process over the past several decades. While
tobacco farms have traditionally been relatively small due to the laborintensive nature of tobacco cultivation, aggregation-friendly policies and
the emergence of labor-reducing technologies have led to a dramatic
decline in the number of tobacco farms—in tandem with an increase in
tobacco acreage per farm.132 The trend toward fewer larger farms has
made it easier for the industry as a whole to consolidate.133 Left
unchecked, the marijuana industry may consolidate in similar fashion.

127. See, e.g., Annie Baxter, Eggs Are Cheap, the U.S. Is Stepping in to Buy Some,
MARKETPLACE (Sept. 2, 2016, 4:14 PM), http://www.marketplace.org/2016/09/02/world/
depression-era-program-behind-uncle-sams-egg-buys (describing the rise of egg prices and drop
of demand in eggs after the avian flu).
128. See, e.g., Dan Charles, Most U.S. Egg Producers Are Now Choosing Cage-Free Houses,
NPR (Jan. 15, 2016, 5:26 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2016/01/15/463190984/mostnew-hen-houses-are-now-cage-free (discussing the higher price of cage-free eggs and how
“[m]any consumers appear willing to stomach that increase, and the cage-free label has proved
powerfully attractive”).
129. See Shruti Date Singh & Lydia Mulvany, Egg Market Disrupted in U.S. as Cages Made
Roomier, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 12, 2014, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2014-12-12/egg-market-disrupted-by-bigger-cages-boosting-price-commodities.
130. See, e.g., 27 C.F.R. § 4.25 (2012) (setting rules for appellations of origin).
131. See Legalising Cannabis: Reeferegulatory Challenge, supra note 121.
132. TOM CAPEHART, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., TRENDS IN U.S. TOBACCO FARMING 3 (2004).
133. Ross Hammond, Consolidation in the Tobacco Industry, 7 TOBACCO CONTROL 426,
426–28 (1998).
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There is evidence consolidation is taking place within states already,134
but the truly disruptive force would be federal marijuana legalization that
permits interstate marijuana commerce.
While policy makers may consider the costs and benefits of marijuana
commoditization and consolidation, consolidation of marijuana farms is
not a given, even in an unregulated environment. While marijuana is
typically described as a uniform product, in reality the industry cultivates
hundreds of unique “strains” of marijuana.135 The strains vary in
appearance, texture, smell, taste, and effect.136 Some have been bred to
maximize tetrahydrocannabinol (or “THC,” the chemical principally
responsible for producing psychoactive effects) to produce a stronger
high.137 The rise of the medical marijuana market, meanwhile, has
prompted farmers to grow strands that minimize THC while maximizing
cannabidiol (or “CBD,” a chemical believed to have a variety of medical
applications).138 In addition, some strains have become de facto branded
products (e.g., “DJ Short’s Blueberry”),139 while others denote a
geographic place of origin (e.g., “Dutch Treat”).140
Many of these strains are challenging to grow and require laborintensive, thwarting efforts to mass-produce them.141 Patent law may
134. See, e.g., John Ingold, Colorado Medical-Marijuana Businesses Have Declined by 40
Percent, DENV. POST (Mar. 2, 2013, 12:31 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/2013/03/02/
colorado-medical-marijuana-businesses-have-declined-by-40-percent; John Maxfield, The
Making of Colorado’s Marijuana Millionaires, MOTLEY FOOL (Jan. 4, 2014, 11:08 AM),
http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2014/01/04/the-making-of-colorados-marijuanamillionaires.aspx (“[T]he [marijuana] industry is beginning to consolidate around two distinct
centers of gravity. The first consists of early adopters . . . . The second center of gravity consists
of newer but deeper-pocketed local entrepreneurs.”).
135. See Jason Sawler et al., The Genetic Structure of Marijuana and Hemp, PLOS ONE,
Aug. 26, 2015, at 1, 2.
136. See generally MED. MARIJUANA STRAINS, http://www.medicalmarijuanastrains.com/
(last visited Dec. 22, 2016) (providing a description of various strains of medical marijuana based
on several factors including appearance, smell, taste, and effect).
137. T. Kid, The Quest to Grow the World’s Most Powerful Pot, VICE (Apr. 10, 2015, 12:00
AM), http://www.vice.com/read/marijuanas-growers-are-upping-the-thc-ante-with-super-potentpot-456.
138. See Sarah Jacoby, Why THC Isn’t the Only Thing in Weed That Matters, REFINERY29
(Aug. 26, 2015, 8:00 PM), http://www.refinery29.com/2015/08/92201/cbd-medical-marijuanafacts#.7i9f2t:fDGW; The Rapid Rise in CBD Interest, LEAFLY MARKETWATCH,
https://www.leafly.com/news/industry/leafly-marketwatch-the-rapid-rise-in-cbd-interest
(last
visited Dec. 22, 2016).
139. DJ Short Blueberry, LEAFLY, https://www.leafly.com/indica/dj-short-blueberry (last
visited Dec. 22, 2016).
140. Dutch Treat, LEAFLY, https://www.leafly.com/hybrid/dutch-treat (last visited Dec. 22,
2016).
141. Ana Campoy, The Pot Business Suffers Growing Pains, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 22, 2013,
4:12 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324345804578426963236807452.
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create additional hurdles for commoditization. The one-year on-sale rule
of patent law would likely preclude existing strains from being
proprietary,142 and generic cultivation signals a move toward
commoditization. But farmers may be able to patent new marijuana
strains in the future,143 and the experimentation and patenting of future
strains may leave room for innovative breeders and intrepid farmers to
continue providing unique products that frustrate the commoditization of
marijuana.
Recalling that commoditization lies on a spectrum, one can accept that
the industry will accommodate large-scale farming methods while
leaving room for small-scale farming and unique specializations. Hemp
products (e.g., textiles or paper) appear to fit the mold of an agricultural
commodity, for example.144 But many states have shown an inclination
toward protectionism in the marijuana industry that further distances the
possibility of commoditization and consolidation. In New Mexico, for
example, state law requires that medical marijuana sold to patients be
grown in New Mexico,145 preventing out-of-state cultivators from
flooding the New Mexico market with generic marijuana. Attempts to
acquire marijuana businesses by out-of-state or out-of-country companies
have also met with public backlash.146 Washington has stringent
residency requirements for marijuana license holders.147 And Colorado
has enacted similarly protective policies.148
Federalism, more than protectionism, may spur marijuana import bans
and residency requirements: Interstate distribution of marijuana falls
more clearly under the province of federal regulation, and the Justice
Department has articulated enforcement priorities under the Controlled
Substances Act that include interstate marijuana commerce.149 But these
protectionist policies are setting precedent and expectations, and perhaps
more importantly, creating individual state industries whose interests
142. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012); Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 55 (1998).
143. See Hilary Bricken, The Possibility of Marijuana Plant Patents, ABOVE LAW (July 6,
2015, 4:20 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2015/07/the-possibility-of-marijuana-plant-patents/
?rf=1; Jonathan M. Purow, Planting the Seeds for IP Protection of Marijuana Brands, LAW360
(Dec. 22, 2015, 10:31 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/733611/planting-the-seeds-for-ipprotection-of-marijuana-brands.
144. RENÉE JOHNSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32725, HEMP AS AN AGRICULTURAL
COMMODITY 1 (2015).
145. Joey Peters, Consolidating and Cashing in on Medical Marijuana, N.M. POL. REP. (May
8, 2015), http://nmpoliticalreport.com/3522/consolidating-and-cashing-in-on-medical-marijuana
DEA.
146. Id.
147. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 314-55-020 (2016).
148. Maxfield, supra note 134.
149. See Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department
Announces Update to Marijuana Enforcement Policy (Aug. 29, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/justice-department-announces-update-marijuana-enforcement-policy.
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may be politically difficult to ignore if the federal prohibition is lifted. In
jurisdictions where marijuana cultivation is economically significant or
even dominant—such as Humboldt, Mendocino, and Trinity counties—
policy makers will receive significant pressure to avoid commoditization
and consolidation of the industry. Early adopting states that are taking on
the risk of legalization may especially want to ensure the benefits stay instate. It would be unusual for a state to require an agricultural product be
grown in-state or to impose residency requirements on cultivators, but
given the unique state-by-state history of marijuana legalization,
regulations to prevent fluid commerce and consolidation of cultivation
are not inconceivable.
B. Conglomerates as Regulatory Transition Mechanism
The long history of small-scale marijuana farming in California may
influence the movement toward limiting farm size and mass-production
of marijuana in the state.150 In states without such a history, allowing or
even encouraging large-scale cultivation may be attractive. In fact,
several states have considered regulations limiting marijuana farming to
a select group of large-scale operators. These consolidation-by-design
proposals would not allow a small-scale marijuana farming culture to take
root, but they do offer a significant advantage to regulators. By limiting
the number of legal cultivators, states can more easily monitor the
industry and enforce regulations.
While California struggles to regulate tens of thousands of marijuana
farms, states like Florida,151 New York,152 and Ohio153 would limit
cultivation licenses to less than a dozen. This type of approach has
benefits. It allows the state to carefully select responsible cultivators,
makes it easy to monitor cultivation, and buys time before presumably
shifting to a more participatory model. With so few cultivators, states can
lavish regulatory attention on the licensees to ensure compliance, or craft
site-specific rules depending on the needs and cultivation infrastructure
of the operation.154 And in a sense the system is predictable by making it
clear that only a select number of businesses may cultivate marijuana.
150. See Harkinson, supra note 10.
151. FLA. STAT. § 381.986(5)(b) (2016).
152. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3365(9) (McKinney 2016); see also Catherine Rafter, New
York State Just Granted Five Medical Marijuana Licenses, OBSERVER (July 31, 2015, 3:00 PM),
http://observer.com/2015/07/new-york-state-just-granted-five-medical-marijuana-licenses/.
153. Medical Marijuana and Personal Use Amendment, Initiative Petition to Ohio Atty. Gen.
(Feb. 13, 2015).
154. In principle, states can tailor any number of water or agricultural permits, but there is a
limit to how extensive the specifications can be when administering large volumes of permit
applications. See Gary D. Lynne et al., Water Permitting Behavior Under the 1972 Florida Water
Resources Act, 67 LAND ECON. 340, 340, 348 (1991).
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There are two major drawbacks to this model. First, it is hard to find
equity or public support when the state permits only a small handful of
cultivators to participate in the market. Ohio’s 2015 constitutional
amendment initiative to legalize marijuana included a list of landowners
who would have had exclusive rights to cultivate marijuana in the state.155
The attempt to control the market prompted some legislators to introduce
a constitutional amendment of their own that would prohibit the state’s
constitution from being used to create economic monopolies,156 while
even some pro-marijuana legalization advocacy groups urged voters to
reject the initiative. Voters did reject the legalization monopoly initiative
(which lacked support from some pro-legalization groups) while
approving the anti-monopoly amendment.157
Even if the state transitions to a more permissive model, the
previously licensed cultivators will have a potentially inequitable leg-up
on the competition. And while the state may have developed the capacity
to create site-specific regulations under the exclusive model, those
capacities would be less relevant when cultivation proliferates and a more
comprehensive regulatory approach is needed.
More importantly perhaps, severe limitations on the issuance of
cultivation licenses ignore the existence and persistence of black market
cultivators. If marijuana cultivation were not occurring to begin with or
were unlikely to take root, a limited licensing approach might be sensible
in some states. But marijuana is widely available in part because domestic
cultivation is increasing across the United States, particularly on private
lands.158 With legalization efforts gaining momentum and spreading
knowledge on cultivation methods, it seems unlikely that marijuana
cultivation will remain dormant for long even in states that currently lack
a meaningful marijuana farming presence. Considering the size and
growth of the marijuana industry, eradication of unlicensed marijuana

155. The amendment’s text included the tax parcel numbers of the properties in question:
Subject to the exceptions set forth herein, there shall be only ten MGCE facilities,
which shall operate on the following real properties: (1) Being an approximate
40.44 acre area in Butler County, Ohio, identified by the Butler County Auditor,
as of February 2, 2015, as tax parcel numbers Q6542084000008 and
Q6542084000041 . . . .
Medical Marijuana and Personal Use Amendment, supra note 153.
156. H.R.J. Res. 4, 131st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2015).
157. Matt Pearce, Ohio Voters Soundly Reject Marijuana Legalization Initiative, L.A. TIMES
(Nov. 3, 2015, 7:51 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-ohio-marijuana-results20151103-story.html.
158. DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL DRUG THREAT ASSESSMENT
SUMMARY 25 (2014).
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cultivators is unlikely.159 Limiting cultivation to a small handful of
businesses offers transitional benefits but is unlikely to be a sound longterm solution.
C. Vertical Integration of the Supply Chain
An alternative method of regulatory oversight over cultivation
requires the chain of supply to be vertically integrated. In other words,
marijuana farmers must sell what they grow, and dispensaries must grow
what they sell. There are significant advantages of the vertical integration
model for regulators. Most importantly, vertical integration reduces the
number of marijuana businesses in operation and makes it easier to track
the supply chain from seed to sale. There are advantages for marijuana
businesses as well—vertical integration may increase profit margins by
reducing the number of profit-seeking firms in the supply chain, while
allowing for more control over inventory. High barriers to entry are
advantageous for businesses that have already overcome the barriers,
after all. Vertically-integrated businesses may also cut down on
redundant business expenses. Vertical integration is mandatory in
Massachusetts,160 Maine,161 New Jersey,162 New Hampshire,163 and New
Mexico.164
But mandatory vertical integration has its drawbacks. It is
significantly more expensive to finance a business that incorporates the
cultivation, post-production, and retail sale of marijuana. By some
estimates, it can be three to ten times more expensive to establish a
vertically-integrated marijuana business than a retail dispensary.165 More
human resource expertise is required to handle a diversity of marijuana
business activities.166 And wedding each stage of the supply chain
together increases risk: Failure in any one aspect of the business is likely
to affect the other aspects as well.167 In general, it is unusual to require
vertical integration, and the marijuana industry is one of the only sectors
159. The Drug Enforcement Administration has described the shift in cultivation practices
toward private lands as an obstacle to law enforcement and eradication. Id. at 26.
160. 105 MASS. CODE REGS. 725.105(N)(1)–(2) (2016).
161. 10-144-122 ME. CODE R. § 6.29 (LexisNexis Nov. 2016).
162. N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 8:64-9.1 to 9.3 (2009) (permitting approved alternative treatment
centers to cultivate, grow, harvest and sell their own marijuana).
163. H.R. 573-FN, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2013) (similar to New Jersey, does not
include purchase as an acceptable activity by an alternative treatment center).
164. N.M. CODE R. § 7.34.4.8(A)(2) (LexisNexis 2015) (focusing on the amount of plants a
non-profit producer is permitted to grow, but does allow for usable cannabis trade from other
licensed producers).
165. 4FRONT PUBL’G, PROS AND CONS OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION 2 (2015).
166. Id.
167. Id.
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in which this occurs.168
Washington prohibits vertical integration.169 Cultivators cannot hold
dispensary licenses, while dispensaries cannot hold cultivation licenses.
The model is similar to regulation of the alcohol industry, with its
mandatory delineation between producers, distributors, and retailers.170
The idea is that by breaking up supply chain integration, businesses have
less incentive to promote alcohol or drug abuse, and each group can focus
on providing goods and services in its area of specialization.171 The model
has had limited success in the alcohol industry, where distributors have
become powerful middlemen and may be dampening the potential for
innovation.172
Other states, recognizing the costs and benefits, have opted to allow,
but not require, vertical integration. Nevada has adopted this approach,173
while Colorado has abandoned its initial vertical integration
requirement.174 Considering the nascent state of the marijuana industry,
it may be useful to allow a diversity of approaches to collect evidence on
how the industry might grow and stabilize in the future. The same can be
said about regulating the industry as well, however: There is value in
letting states experiment with a diversity of regulatory approaches.
Vertical integration is likely to have particular implications on the
agricultural component of the marijuana industry. Where required, it will
make cultivation one component of a broader marijuana business, while
reducing the likelihood that marijuana can become one of several crops
grown on a single farm. More and more farmers growing traditional crops
are considering incorporating marijuana into their crop portfolio,175 but
in states where vertical integration is mandatory it seems unlikely that
these farmers will want to devote their resources to post-production and
retail in order to do so. The effect is that the marijuana industry remains
introverted, minimally engaged with the broader agricultural community.
On the other hand, the supply of marijuana is presumably less likely to
168. Id.
169. WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.328 (2012).
170. See 4FRONT PUBL’G, supra note 165, at 2.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 3.
173. NEV. REV. STAT. § 453A.056 (2015) (allowing retailers, cultivators, and in limited
cases, users to produce usable marijuana).
174. See John Ingold, Colorado Lawmakers Question Proposed Marijuana Business Rules,
DENV. POST (Mar. 21, 2013, 5:33 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/2013/03/21/coloradolawmakers-question-proposed-marijuana-business-rules.
175. See, e.g., Rob Hotakainen, With No Federal Water, Pot Growers Could Be High and
(2014)
(Apr. 27, 2014, 3:00 AM),
Dry,
MCCLATCHY WASH. BUREAU
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/national/article24766780.html (describing a
cantaloupe famer in Washington who has applied to grow marijuana).
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fluctuate wildly relative to its demand if farmers are required to sell what
they grow. By tying cultivation and retail together, both activities may be
more responsive to each other.
Finally, vertical integration may increase market consolidation. The
financial and human resources needed to establish an integrated
marijuana business and navigate each supply chain component’s
regulatory requirements may create such a high barrier to entry that
small-scale farmers are shut out, leaving only a select few capital-rich
businesses to dominate the market. In the early years of Colorado’s
medical marijuana market when vertical integration was required, the
regulatory requirements were so onerous that over a third of operators
went out of business.176
Nonetheless, vertical integration brings both promising benefits and
concerning costs. It is a unique regulatory approach in an agricultural and
commercial sense, but not one without a rationale, and several states have
taken proactive measures to adopt or reject integration. As states
transition toward legalization and work to refine their regulatory systems,
vertical integration promises to be a contentious policy consideration.
D. The Promise of Marijuana Appellations
In response to fears that legalization will lead to commoditization of
the marijuana industry and a consequent influx of generic marijuana that
runs small-scale farmers out of business, some jurisdictions have
proposed adopting appellations for marijuana cultivation.177 An
appellation is a certified designation of origin that may also require that
certain quality or stylistic standards be met.178 Appellations are most
commonly associated with the wine industry, but they can be applied to
any agricultural or food product in which the geographic origin carries
176. See Ingold, supra note 134; Tim Sprinkle, For Cannabis Entrepreneurs, Industry
Expansion Brings Growing Pains, YAHOO FIN. (Mar. 11, 2013), http://finance.yahoo.com/
news/marijuana-industry-faces-growing-pains-amid-consolidation--growth-214432335.html.
177. Neither the state of California nor Humboldt County has established an appellation
system, but Humboldt County’s Marijuana Ordinance establishes an artisanal labelling program,
and interest groups representing the marijuana industry have advocated for a more robust
appellation system to protect the Humboldt County brand. Interview with Anonymous Member
of the California Cannabis Voice Humboldt, in Arcata, Cal. (Sept. 10, 2015).
178. In the wine industry, for example, the appellation system in the United States is only
concerned with geography, while the European Union’s appellations typically require more
stringent standards be met. See Warren Moran, The Wine Appellation as Territory in France and
California, ANNALS ASS’N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 694, 697 (1993) (comparing appellation systems
in France and California); see also David E. R. Gay & Ralph B. Hutchinson, A Comparative
Analysis of French and U.S. Wine Appellations, ATLANTIC ECON. J., Dec. 1987, at 99, 99 (arguing
that U.S. appellations have no consistent unifying structure, while French practices are
systematic).
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importance.179 The wine industry’s model rests on the assumption that
environmental conditions (soil, aridity, temperature, etc., collectively
known as the “terroir”180) influence grape quality, and there is general
agreement that this assumption has merit.181 Designation requirements
that have quality standards also tend to increase the quality of grapes
grown in the appellation, improving wine quality and the region’s
reputation.182As the reputation of a region’s agricultural product grows,
the appellation designation creates a unique market for the product,
increasing prices while precluding other producers from free-riding on
the region’s reputation or duplicating its products.183 Appellations
therefore create differentiation in the marketplace, frustrating efforts to
commoditize the industry with one generic product.184 Protectionism of
local industries and their brands (e.g., Champagne, France) has a
secondary benefit. By certifying that products with geographic indicators
are accurately designated, consumers are assured of authenticity and are
more likely to pay more for higher quality products. These twin goals of
providing economic benefits and consumer protection underlie the basic
motivations of most appellation systems.185
The appellation model may be well-suited to the marijuana industry
for several reasons. First, there is some merit to the claim that
environmental conditions influence marijuana quality, and would
therefore provide a basis for place-of-origin designations.186 Marijuana
farming has become so widespread in northern California in part because
growing conditions there are ideal. While California is known for being
an infamously arid state, in reality the problem is distributional: while
almost all of its population is located to the south, most of the state’s
179. See Mary Murphy, What Does “AOC” Mean and What Does It Say About a Cheese?,
FORMAGGIO KITCHEN (June 18, 2010), http://www.formaggiokitchen.com/blog/what-does-aocmean-and-what-does-it-tell-us-about-a-cheese.
180. Terroir, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO WINE 700 (Jancis Robinson ed., 2d ed. 1999).
181. Michael Maher, Comment, Vino Veritas? Clarifying the Use of Geographic References
on American Wine Labels, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1881, 1884 (2001).
182. Geographical Delimitation, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO WINE, supra note 180, at
229, 229.
183. See Jay Kiiha, Trade Protectionism of Wine Brand Names at the Expense of American
Viticultural Areas: Arbitrary Protection of “Big Liquor” at the Expense of Small Vineyards, 9
DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 157, 159 (2004). Of course, the model also fosters fraud as lesser or outside
cultivators attempt to claim a region as their own, or simply confuse the consumer. Id. at 168.
184. Christopher A. Bartlett & Sumantra Ghoshal, Going Global: Lessons from Late Movers,
HARV. BUS. REV. (Mar.–Apr. 2000), https://hbr.org/2000/03/going-global-lessons-from-latemovers.
185. See Maher, supra note 181, at 1885–86.
186. See Cannabis Terroir 101: What Is It, and What Factors Affect It?, LEAFLY,
https://www.leafly.com/news/cannabis-101/cannabis-terroir-outdoor-growing/ (last visited Jan.
26, 2017).
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water resources were historically located north of Sacramento.187 As a
double bonus, California’s northern counties are dry during the summer
growing season, when excess precipitation and humidity might dampen
and spoil marijuana crops.188 The strains being developed and cultivated
in northern California are therefore well-adapted to these unique growing
conditions.
In Jamaica, by contrast, marijuana farmers traditionally used genetic
strains that were accustomed to tropical humidity and temperatures,
cultivating marijuana with their own unique characteristics.189 Seed
companies regularly market their strains to match a diversity of outdoor
conditions.190 Instead of competing with each other to produce the most
popular generic strains, appellations would allow regions to embrace the
strains that grow well in their environment. France’s Burgundy and
Rhône regions are well-known for growing pinot noir and syrah grape
varietals, respectively.191 Neither region is threatened by outside
producers or forced to adopt ill-suited varietals because they have created
individual markets for their own well-respected grapes. The same could
be true of marijuana producing regions.
The economic incentive to provide monopolistic protections and
marketing power to appellation regions is, without doubt, of particular
interest to the marijuana industry. Counties that have developed robust
marijuana farming industries may feel that the influx of mass-produced
generic marijuana that would come from national legalization may wipe
out their existing small-scale farmers. Appellations can protect the brandname associated with a region, as well as the farmers that make the region
economically productive. An appellation system could ensure that only
marijuana grown in Humboldt County, California carries with it the
Humboldt County designation. In addition, marijuana appellations can
187. Measurements taken between 1894 and 1947 showed the region north of Sacramento—
including Mendocino, Trinity, and Humboldt counties—contained 73% of the state’s water
resources. Gordon R. Miller, Shaping California Water Law, 1781 to 1928, 55 S. CAL. Q. 9, 9
(1973).
188. As discussed below, this can create water allocation problems if water storage during
fallow seasons is insufficient. See Bauer et al., supra note 13, at 17.
189. While there are myriad problems with the Jamaican marijuana industry, and little
research on the subject, anecdotal evidence indicates that indigenous strains are well adapted and
can produce quality marijuana. See Pete Brady, Ganja Gardens, CANNABIS CULTURE (Oct. 25,
2002), http://www.cannabisculture.com/content/2002/10/25/2412.
190. See, e.g., Cannabis Seeds for Cool Climate, Barneys Farm Seeds, BARNEYS FARM SHOP,
https://www.barneysfarmshop.com/barneys-farm-seeds/outdoor-cannabis-seeds/cool-climate.html
(last
visited
Jan.
25,
2017);
Outdoor
Cannabis
Seeds,
SENSI SEEDS,
https://sensiseeds.com/en/cannabis-seeds/outdoor (last visited Jan. 25, 2017).
191. See Main Grape Varieties by European Wine Region, 1855 CONSULTING,
https://1855consulting.com/news-articles/main-grape-varieties-by-european-wine-region/ (last
visited Jan. 25, 2017).
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adopt specific standards that collectively enhance the quality and
reputation of their region. In France, for example, wine appellations can
require that vineyards only use certain varietals, limit irrigation practices
that increase yields at the cost of grape quality, or attain a predetermined
alcohol content.192 These requirements make production more
challenging, and in some cases may stifle creativity and innovation, but
the requirements collectively increase the region’s overall product. Many
of these practices could be applied to marijuana cultivation as well.
Of course, this model would benefit from a broadly inclusive (i.e.,
transboundary) regulatory framework in order to be effective. The United
States wine industry’s appellations are regulated by the Treasury
Department’s Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (TTB, a
federal agency),193 but the TTB is unlikely to establish a national
appellation system for marijuana if cultivation remains illegal under
federal law. States can develop their own appellation regulation
frameworks, however, and as long as states maintain import and export
bans (likely in the short-term given federal interstate commerce
enforcement concerns) those state regulations may prove to be
sufficiently effective. State appellation regulations may even prove
resilient if the federal prohibition is lifted and a federal agency regulates
the industry.194
Nonetheless, it would be challenging for individual counties or local
government bodies to enforce their own appellation designations if other
jurisdictions do not follow suit. Enforcement of geographic indicators
outside of the regulatory body’s jurisdiction is notoriously difficult. In
one infamous case, it took fourteen years and a trade mission for the Napa
Valley Vintners Association to convince the Chinese government to grant
protected status to the term “Napa.”195 While the marijuana industry is
increasingly mobilized and represented through interest groups,196 it will
be challenging to persuade jurisdictions to recognize geographic
indicators without the assistance of a broader regulatory framework. Still,
local attempts to create appellations can generate momentum and set
precedent for other jurisdictions to replicate the model. It is not a given
192. Daniel W. Gade, Tradition, Territory, and Terrior in French Viticulture: Cassis,
France, and Appellation Contrôlée, 94 ANNALS ASS’N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 848, 852 (2004).
193. 27 C.F.R. § 4.3 (2016).
194. See Bronco Wine Co. v. Jolly, 95 P.3d 422, 425 (Cal. 2004) (finding that a more
restrictive state wine labelling statute is not preempted by federal regulations).
195. Laura Zanzig, The Perfect Pairing: Protecting U.S. Geographical Indications with a
Sino-American Wine Registry, 88 WASH. L. REV. 723, 724–25 (2013).
196. For example, the Cannabis Club Voice Humboldt and Emerald Growers Association
represent marijuana farmers in northern California. See Peter Hecht, California Marijuana Market
Readies for “Robust” New Era, SACRAMENTO BEE (Oct. 18, 2015, 4:00 PM),
http://www.sacbee.com/news/state/california/california-weed/article39804690.html.
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that the TTB will establish marijuana appellation regulations upon
legalization, but farmers and state and local governments can make that
more likely by creating the foundations for regulation.
The second incentive to create appellations—providing consumer
protection—is equally compelling in the marijuana industry. Because
marijuana has been (and in many jurisdictions continues to be) cultivated
on the black market, consumers have traditionally had little to no
information regarding where or how their marijuana was grown. This
does not reflect consumer preferences, of course. It is notoriously difficult
to determine the origin of marijuana even in the aggregate,197 but by one
estimate two-thirds of marijuana consumed in the United States came
from Mexico in 2008.198 Given the well-publicized violence and
corruption associated with Mexican drug cartels,199 it is not unreasonable
to believe consumer behavior would reflect a preference for domestically
grown marijuana if reliable geographic designations were provided to the
consumer. Given marijuana’s illicit dimensions, marijuana appellations
can provide some assurance of authenticity and ethical cultivation. There
is evidence that legal marijuana cultivation in the United States is driving
“cartel grows” out of business;200 appellations can continue that trend by
providing consumers with choices that meet their standards in similar
fashion.
Appellations can provide consumers with more information than place
of origin as well. The requirements common in French wine appellations
mentioned above (e.g., restricting supply, eligible varietals, or alcohol
content) are not only collectively beneficial to the region’s producers,
they also provide more information to the consumer.201 Considering how
many strains of marijuana are in existence, there is value in a regulatory
framework that easily and reliably communicates important
characteristics to consumers, such as the strain and its THC or CBD
197. See, e.g., Jon Gettman, Lost Taxes and Other Costs of Marijuana Laws, DRUG SCI.,
http://www.drugscience.org/Archive/bcr4/5Supply.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2017) (discussing
the different methods used to estimate the amount of marijuana in the United States).
198. Deborah Bonello, Mexican Marijuana Farmers See Profits Tumble as U.S. Loosens
Laws, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2015, 3:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/world/mexico-americas/lafg-mexico-marijuana-20151230-story.html (referring to the estimation of Beau Kilmer, codirector of the Rand Corp. Drug Policy Research Center). Other estimates complicate the picture,
claiming that by 2010 approximately 80% of marijuana consumed in the United States came from
California. E.g., Emily Brady, How Humboldt Became America’s Marijuana Capital, SALON
(June 30, 2013, 12:30 PM), http://www.salon.com/2013/06/30/how_humboldt_became_
americas_marijuana_capital/.
199. See, e.g., William Neuman, As Drug Kingpins Fall in Mexico, Cartels Fracture and
Violence Surges, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/13/world/
americas/as-mexico-arrests-kingpins-cartels-splinter-and-violence-spikes.html?_r=1.
200. See Bonello, supra note 198.
201. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
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levels.
There is reason to question the appellation model’s suitability for
marijuana agriculture. Perhaps the most apparent obstacle is the fact that
a significant percentage of marijuana is grown indoors. Since outdoor
cultivation was risky during prohibition, the marijuana industry has a
long track record of, and experience with, indoor cultivation. Growing
indoors now offers advantages beyond privacy, allowing farmers to
manipulate growing conditions such as soil content, air temperature, and
light energy to maximize yields.202 As one might expect, however,
growing indoors makes the “terroir,” or geographic elements, much less
relevant.
However, appellations can still facilitate the creation of unique
localized markets if regions adopt their own growing standards. The
marijuana industry has come under intense scrutiny on account of the
energy demands of indoor agriculture,203 and appellations could require
indoor operations to meet clean energy standards. One county has already
required indoor farms to use exclusively renewable energy sources (such
as solar panels, ironically).204 Appellations could also provide incentives
for farmers to transition to, and embrace, outdoor cultivation by providing
the geographic indicator protection (and its economic benefits) solely to
outdoor marijuana farms.
While appellations would frustrate efforts to commoditize marijuana,
an appellation system would not preclude consolidation. The U.S. wine
industry has been experiencing rapid consolidation despite a robust
origin-focused appellation system.205 The number of small-scale
vineyards has remained stable, however indicating a strong market for
unique wines.206 And it may be that consolidation is facilitated by the fact
that U.S. appellation designations are only concerned with geographic
origin, and do not impose quality or cultivation standards on producers.
In any case, the benefits of a marijuana appellation system are sufficient
to justify consideration, if not adoption. Especially in regions concerned
that mass-produced generic marijuana will have devastating economic
consequences for small-scale farmers, finding ways to differentiate
products and generate market value will be an important policymaking
objective. A marijuana appellation system may provide the regulatory
framework needed to achieve that objective.

202. BERGMAN, supra note 104, at ch. 2.
203. See discussion infra Section III.C.
204. HUMBOLDT, CAL., CODE tit. III, div. 1, ch. 3, § 313-55.4 (2016).
205. Rachael Goodhue et al., California Wine Industry Evolving to Compete in the 21st
Century, 62 CAL. AGRIC. 12, 16 (2008).
206. Id.
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III. REGULATING THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF
MARIJUANA AGRICULTURE
The underlying premise of this Article is that states that have legalized
marijuana, or are transitioning toward legalization, have focused their
regulatory attention on issues like taxation, public health, and retail
licensing, at the expense of agricultural issues raised by marijuana
legalization. The environmental impacts of marijuana agriculture
exemplify this premise. Marijuana plants require significant quantities of
water resources, and it is not clear that existing water laws or regulations
can accommodate the marijuana industry or regulate the water resource
impacts to both quantity and quality. The prevalence of indoor growing
operations, meanwhile, requires inordinate energy resources and creates
a disturbing carbon footprint. Energy demands are so great that energy
markets in some states are being strained and the viability of indoor
marijuana farming called into question.207 Without regulatory
requirements or market-based certificate programs that recognize and
reward sustainable marijuana farming, farmers have few incentives to
exercise restraint. Finally, the federal marijuana prohibition prevents the
marijuana industry from enjoying government programs that provide
support to farmers in times of environmental stress. Without crop
insurance or disaster relief programs, marijuana farmers remain
vulnerable to extreme events.
A. Regulating Water Allocations
In the winter of 2015, I started researching the relationship between
marijuana farming and state water laws. In March of that year, the first
credible scientific study of the impacts of cultivation on water resources
found that the demand for water to irrigate marijuana plants often
outstripped water supplies.208 Data from the study came from the Eel
River watershed in northern California.209 In June of 2015, a convoy of
vehicles carrying enforcement officers from four different counties of
northern California drove up and into the remote and rugged slopes of the
Eel River watershed.210 The enforcement officers conducted open-field
searches on private lands, which was unusual up to this point, and by the
end of the weeklong “Operation Emerald Tri-County” had confiscated

207. See infra notes 260–62 and accompanying text.
208. Bauer et al., supra note 13, at 17.
209. Id. at 10.
210. Andrew Goff, Major Multi-Agency Marijuana Raid in Island Mountain Today, LOST
COAST OUTPOST (June 22, 2015, 1:38 PM), https://lostcoastoutpost.com/2015/jun/22/majormarijuana-raid-island-mountain-today.
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86,578 marijuana plants.211
“Operation Emerald Tri-County” was the clearest sign yet that the
rapidly evolving forces of marijuana legalization and water scarcity were
about to collide. The enforcement officers were not joined by federal
officials, but rather personnel from the California Department of Fish and
Wildlife on suspicion of water abuses.212 Later the four counties claimed
the raid itself was motivated by violations of state water regulations, not
marijuana cultivation.213 After finding unpermitted streambed alterations,
diversions, and reservoirs, the officials moved to confiscate the privately
grown plants.214
The collision between marijuana legalization and state water laws
prompted further research that led to a full-length law review article on
the topic.215 Because the relationship between marijuana and water
resources is so important for the emerging field of marijuana agriculture
in general, a brief summary of those research findings is presented here.
In short, there is some potential for existing water laws to accommodate
marijuana legalization without requiring regulatory intervention from the
state,216 but more than likely, states will need to develop a regulatory
framework (or modify an existing one) that responds to the unique
demands that legal marijuana cultivation places on water resources and
water rights.217
In the American West, states will need to balance the temptation to
provide marijuana farmers with water access (lest they make illegal
appropriations or move out-of-state) with existing appropriative rights
that give priority to senior rights holders.218 The federal Bureau of
Reclamation will make this particularly difficult as long as the federal
marijuana prohibition persists, because it has articulated a prohibition
policy that would prevent marijuana agriculture from appropriating any
water resources controlled by the Bureau or passing through a Bureau
facility.219 Notwithstanding the Bureau of Reclamation’s vast influence
on western water resources, it is unclear if the policy will lead to
211. Adam Randall, Tri-County Pot Raids Net 86,578 Plants, UKIAH DAILY J. (June 29,
2015, 11:10 AM), http://www.chicoer.com/general-news/20150629/tri-county-pot-raids-net86578-plants.
212. See Goff, supra note 210.
213. See Randall, supra note 211.
214. Id.
215. Ryan B. Stoa, Weed and Water Law: Regulating Legal Marijuana, 67 HASTINGS L.J.
565 (2016). The present article draws from, and builds on, the findings and research presented in
Weed and Water Law.
216. Id. at 616–19.
217. Id. at 620.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 586–87.
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meaningful enforcement.220
Fortunately, most prior appropriation states administer water rights
through a regulatory agency equipped to address emerging issues
proactively, without significantly interfering with existing rights. 221 The
prior appropriation doctrine will make it challenging to appease a brand
new agricultural subsector, but states have more flexibility than strict
doctrinal applications would suggest.
Riparian doctrine states (found in the Eastern United States) may have
a slightly easier time adjusting to legal marijuana cultivation, as riparian
rights are not fixed but accommodate reasonable uses of shared waters.222
Regulated riparian states might not have as much flexibility in the shortterm if existing permits allocate all of the available water resources of a
watercourse, but in the long-term agencies retain the flexibility to shape
water use in the state by controlling the permit process.223 That flexibility
could provide ample room for farmers and regulators to maneuver in the
new marijuana economy.
In many states the challenges of regulating marijuana water use
remains theoretical. In California, however, the issue is very real. Water
is already a scarce and fiercely controlled resource, with a complex
system of riparian, appropriative, and groundwater rights.224 The various
water rights regimes in California provide multiple opportunities to create
or recognize rights to water for marijuana cultivators, but the complexity
of the system will make it challenging to navigate and capitalize on those
opportunities. California’s decentralized approach to marijuana
regulation, meanwhile, is allowing local governments to move in many
different directions, sometimes at cross-purposes.225 The size of the
marijuana cultivation industry in California is the largest in the United
States, and given the scarcity of water resources in the state, a more
proactive and integrated approach to regulating marijuana irrigation is
justified and may be explored in the future.226
Two themes emerged from this study of water law and marijuana
cultivation. First, theoretical applications of water law to marijuana
cultivation needs demonstrate that while these doctrines are often
criticized for being rigid and antiquated, there is room in the law for
jurisdictions to provide enough water to marijuana farmers that they will
220. Id. at 587; see Hotakainen, supra note 175.
221. Stoa, supra note 215, at 620.
222. Id. at 594.
223. Id. at 620.
224. Id.; see also Charles J.P. Podolak & Martin Doyle, Conditional Water Rights in the
Western United States: Introducing Uncertainty to Prior Appropriation?, 51 J. AM. WATER RES.
ASS’N 14, 14–15 (2015).
225. Stoa, supra note 215, at 620; see, e.g., supra notes 33–37 and accompanying text
(demonstrating the divergent paths for counties in California and Colorado).
226. Stoa, supra note 215, at 620; see also Brady, supra note 198.
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participate in the regulatory process without significantly disrupting
existing water rights. This is particularly true in jurisdictions that adopt a
modified or regulatory version of traditional doctrine that softens the
rigidities of the common law.
The second theme is that in practice, the initial signs coming from
states where marijuana cultivation is legal to some degree suggest that
the theoretical ability of water law doctrine to incorporate marijuana
cultivation is not sufficient to ensure a smooth or equitable transition.
There are too many legal ambiguities in both water laws and marijuana
agriculture laws for the application of both simultaneously to function
coherently and consistently. In order to promote sustainable, responsible,
and legal marijuana cultivation, while administering water rights
equitably, states will need to adjust their regulatory frameworks to
address the challenges that marijuana legalization presents.
Since that study was completed, California passed the Medical
Marijuana Regulation and Safety Act (MMRSA), with ambitious
proposals to create comprehensive regulations for marijuana agriculture,
including water allocation provisions.227 The MMRSA assigns authority
for various regulatory responsibilities to a variety of state agencies,
including the Department of Food and Agriculture, Department of Public
Health, Department of Fish and Wildlife, and the State Water Resources
Control Board.228 It remains to be seen if the various agencies involved
in regulating water allocations will be able to coordinate, articulate, and
enforce clear policies that incentivize participation from marijuana
farmers while managing water resources sustainably and respecting
existing water rights holders. Still, the MMRSA is a promising sign that
states are beginning to take water resource issues seriously and will begin
to develop regulations that address water allocation.
B. Regulating Water Quality and Pesticide Use
While water quality was not the focus of the study, in many ways the
distinction between water quantity and water quality is, from a
hydrological perspective, illogical. When water levels drop, water quality
often deteriorates as pollutants become less diluted. Conversely,
introducing pollutants into a water resource reduces the quantity of clean
water available. In some ways, the common laws for water allocation
address this relationship—in riparian jurisdictions, water quality impact

227. A.B. 243, 2015–16 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015); A.B. 266, 2015–16 Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015); S.B. 643, 2015–16 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015).
228. A.B. 243.
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can be a factor in determining whether a water use is reasonable;229 while
in prior appropriation jurisdictions, instream flows (water resources left
in the waterway to maintain ecological needs or water quality) have been
recognized as a beneficial water use.230
For the most part, however, modern water law systems distinguish
between water quantity and water quality, with some regulations
addressing water allocations and others addressing water pollution.231
Just as water allocation laws will need to reconcile tensions between
marijuana agriculture and water rights, so too will water quality laws need
to reconcile marijuana agriculture’s impacts on water quality. And
although research on the topic remains limited, what studies do exist
suggest that if left unchecked, marijuana agriculture may have significant
negative impacts on water quality.232
A 2013 study on wildlife mortality found a link between rodenticide
found in dead mammals and the density of nearby marijuana farms,
suggesting that pesticides and fertilizers may be seeping into the broader
environment, including water resources.233 And the deforestation, land
terracing, and road building associated with large marijuana grows
contribute to erosion and sediment loading of streams, according to a
2012 study of western public lands.234 More research is needed, but there
is sufficient evidence to conclude that marijuana agriculture produces the
same three forms of runoff pollution (pesticides, fertilizers, and sediment)
that have been a problem for agricultural regulation in general.235 On this
basis, states may consider whether their existing water quality regulations
are sufficient to address runoff pollution from marijuana agriculture.
One major difference between water allocation laws and water quality
laws is that water allocation regulation has traditionally been a state
function, whereas the federal government has stepped in to regulate water
quality through enactment and enforcement of the Clean Water Act
(CWA).236 The CWA declared, “It is the policy of the Congress to
recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of
229. FRANK P. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 3.02, at 33–37 (2015); see also
Peter N. Davis, Federal and State Water Quality Regulation and Law in Missouri, 55 MO. L. REV.
411, 489–90 (1990).
230. Lawrence J. Macdonnell, Prior Appropriation: A Reassessment, 18 U. DENV. WATER
L. REV. 228, 279 (2015).
231. See, e.g., 7-7000 DEL. ADMIN. CODE § 5 (2016); 7-7201 DEL. ADMIN. CODE § 8 (2016).
232. See Carah et al., supra note 15, at 822, 866.
233. Thompson et al., supra note 14, at 91, 93.
234. See Carah et al., supra note 15, at 824í25 (citing Jim F. Milestone et al., Continued
Cultivation of Illegal Marijuana in U.S. Western National Parks, PROC. OF THE 2011 GEORGE
WRIGHT SOC’Y CONF. ON PARKS PROTECTED AREAS & CULTURAL SITES 209, 212 (2012)).
235. See id. at 825.
236. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2012).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2017

39

Florida Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 1

336

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution.”237 To implement this
objective, Congress uses financial incentives238 and the threat of
preemption239 to obtain state participation and compliance with the Act.
For example, states may create their own water pollution control plans,
including state water quality standards, effluent limitations, and
watercourse-specific designated uses.240 If the state fails to do so, or if its
standards do not meet federal minimums,241 the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) is authorized to regulate on behalf of the
state.242 This rarely happens, in part because Congress provides funding
for the development of pollution control programs,243 research,244 and
construction of treatment works,245 a major incentive for state
participation.
Unfortunately, the CWA has not been effective at eliminating
pollution from agricultural runoff, largely because the CWA is not
designed to address nonpoint source pollution (pollution that does not
originate from a discrete source).246 Instead of regulating agricultural
runoff directly, states and the federal government attempt to regulate
runoff indirectly by funding pollution control programs that enhance
monitoring or encourage sustainable farming practices.247 These
collaborative water pollution control programs often involve a diverse set
of stakeholders that include state and federal agencies, and
representatives of the agricultural industry.248 A wide variety of policy
tools and approaches are also available to address agricultural runoff.249
237. Id.; see also District of Columbia v. Schramm, 631 F.2d 854, 860 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(finding that “Congress carefully constructed a legislative scheme that imposed major
responsibility for control of water pollution on the states”). See generally Oliver A. Houck,
Cooperative Federalism, Nutrients, and the Clean Water Act: Three Cases Revisited, 44 ENVTL.
L. REP. 10,426 (2014) (providing an analysis of the CWA and related judicial decisions).
238. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1255, 1381 (2012).
239. Id. § 1361.
240. Id. § 1313.
241. Id. § 1313(e)(3)(A).
242. Id. § 1361.
243. Id. § 1256.
244. Id. § 1255.
245. Id. §§ 1281–1301.
246. See Lara B. Fowler et al., Addressing Death by a Thousand Cuts: Legal and Policy
Innovations to Address Nonpoint Source Runoff, CHOICES, 2013, at 1, 2, 4; Adena R. Rissman &
Stephen R. Carpenter, Progress on Nonpoint Pollution: Barriers & Opportunities, 144 DAEDALUS
35, 43 (2015).
247. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2012).
248. See, e.g., Chesapeake Bay Total Maximum Daily Load, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/chesapeake-bay-tmdl (last visited Mar. 29, 2016).
249. See, e.g., Brian M. Dowd et al., Agricultural Nonpoint Source Water Pollution Policy:
The Case of California’s Central Coast, 128 AGRIC. ECOSYSTEMS & ENV’T 151, 152í55 (2008).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol69/iss2/1

40

Stoa: Marijuana Agriculture Law: Regulation At The Root Of An Industry

2017]

MARIJUANA AGRICULTURE LAW: REGULATION AT THE ROOT OF AN INDUSTRY

337

Fortunately, approaches that encourage stakeholder engagement and
provide incentives for farmers to participate are precisely what is needed
in the marijuana agriculture sector. As the marijuana industry has been
operating in the shadows for decades, marijuana farmers are quite capable
of evading onerous regulations. At least during the transition to
legalization, it will be important for states to engage the marijuana
farming community and tailor regulations to obtain broad-based support
for regulatory programs.
Nonetheless, developing effective water quality control programs for
the marijuana industry will be challenging. First, states may not have
access to resources or programs fostered by the CWA given the federal
marijuana prohibition. Although it would be difficult to distinguish
marijuana-based agricultural runoff from general agricultural runoff, the
federal government may not support programs that target and legitimize
marijuana agriculture. In 2010, a Mendocino County, California program
successfully partnered private growers with county officials to monitor
plants and facilitate regulatory compliance, but a federal raid and
subpoena of the program’s paperwork shut it down and broke up the
partnership.250 A local or state government program that does not
implicate the federal government would likely avoid federal prosecution
today, considering Congress passed a bill in December 2014 prohibiting
the Department of Justice from using federal funds to interfere with state
implementation of medical marijuana laws,251 which a federal court
subsequently held protects private individuals and businesses from
prosecution as well.252 However, many pollution control programs
receive funding from the federal government and would be more difficult
to apply to marijuana agriculture than a purely state or local program.253
Furthermore, because marijuana regulation is so novel across the
board, water pollution control programs will need to work with other
governments and regulatory agencies to be effective and complementary.
In May 2015, one month before “Operation Emerald Tri-County” raided
marijuana farms in northern California, California’s North Coast
Regional Water Quality Control Board held a workshop in the area to
discuss the Board’s proposed water quality regulations for marijuana
250. Josh Harkinson, The Landscape-Scarring, Energy-Sucking, Wildlife-Killing Reality of
Pot Farming, MOTHER JONES (Mar./Apr. 2014), http://www.motherjones.com/environment/
2014/03/marijuana-weed-pot-farming-environmental-impacts.
251. Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No.
113-235, tit. V, sec. 538, 128 Stat. 2173, 2217 (2014).
252. United States v. Marin All. for Med. Marijuana, 139 F. Supp. 3d 1039, 1047í48 (N.D.
Cal. 2015).
253. See, e.g., Clean Water Partnership Loan Program Awards $1.9 Million for Sewer
Upgrades, MINN. POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY (July 27, 2016), https://www.pca.state.mn.us/
news/clean-water-partnership-loan-program-awards-19-million-sewer-upgrades.
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cultivation.254 The goal was to solicit input from marijuana farmers and
invite them to participate in a mutually beneficial regulatory scheme.255
Farmers would be asked to clean up their operations and invest in water
quality technologies, and in exchange, the Board would give farmers
cover to address water quality issues openly and legally.256 The workshop
ended on a promising note,257 but several weeks later, local sheriffs’
departments and the California Department of Fish and Wildlife
conducted the Island Mountain raids targeting farmers allegedly violating
environmental regulations.258 The incident showed that without a clear
framework for regulating marijuana cultivation, aspects of marijuana
regulation like water quality control will suffer from a lack of
coordination.
Notwithstanding these challenges, states have experience addressing
agricultural runoff through adaptable pollution control programs. The
diversity of regulatory tools and approaches available can and should be
considered to develop a water pollution control program capable of
incentivizing participation from marijuana farmers while making
meaningful reductions in water pollution.
C. Energy Use and Indoor Agriculture
While to some extent the media have chronicled the impact of
marijuana agriculture on water resources, marijuana’s energy demands
and carbon footprint have received widespread attention in both the press
and academic scholarship.259 Growing marijuana indoors requires highintensity lighting, ventilation, and climate control systems, all of which
are energy-intensive.260 A 2012 study found that the energy consumed by
indoor agriculture alone constitutes 1% of total electricity use in the
United States, with carbon emissions reaching fifteen million metric
tons.261 In California, indoor cultivation accounts for 3% of total
254. Media Release, Cal. Water Bds., North Coast Water Board to Hold Workshop May 7
on Marijuana Cultivation (May 4, 2015), http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/press_room/press_
releases/2015/pr050715_northcoast_fnl.pdf.
255. Id.
256. See Baumann, supra note 16.
257. Id. One farmer noted that “[t]he water board staff are our preferred regulators because
they don’t carry guns and badges.” Id.
258. See supra notes 210–11 and accompanying text.
259. Tom Huddleston, Jr., The Booming Pot Industry Is Draining the U.S. Energy Supply,
FORTUNE (Dec. 21, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/12/21/marijuana-energy-consumption/; Gina
S. Warren, Regulating Pot to Save the Polar Bear: Energy and Climate Impacts of the Marijuana
Industry, 40 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 385, 401–08 (2015).
260. Evan Mills, The Carbon Footprint of Indoor Cannabis Production, 46 ENERGY POL’Y
58, 59 (2012).
261. Id.
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electricity use.262 Those estimates are likely obsolete, as many states have
since legalized the recreational or medicinal use of marijuana. In
Colorado, indoor marijuana farms comprise almost half of new demand
for power.263 Power providers and state regulators are scrambling to
adjust to rapid changes in the energy sector that indoor marijuana
agriculture has caused.264
Unsurprisingly, the federal marijuana prohibition complicates energy
regulation as well. Many utilities receive power from federal energy
projects or facilities, are regulated directly or indirectly by federal
agencies, or receive federal funding.265 Accordingly, it is unclear if those
utilities are legally permitted to provide energy for purposes of marijuana
cultivation. The uncertainty has prompted some agencies to refrain from
creating proactive regulations to address the marijuana industry’s energy
use.266 The Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission v. Electric Power Supply Ass’n267 reinforced the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission’s (FERC) authority to regulate retail
electricity (traditionally a state power) if it affects wholesale power
rates.268 But unlike the Bureau of Reclamation, the FERC has not
articulated a marijuana policy.269
Many jurisdictions have begun to address marijuana agriculture,
however, and these early experiments with energy regulation will prove
instructive to states as they transition toward legalization. Approaches
include a mix of sticks and carrots. In Oregon, where marijuana-induced
energy demand has led to several power outages in recent months, a trust
provides cash incentives and technical assistance for cultivation
operations.270 Utilities in Denver, Colorado, and Seattle, Washington,
similarly provide incentives in the form of efficient lighting upgrades or
rebate programs.271
262. Id.
263. Jennifer Oldham, As Pot-Growing Expands, Electricity Demands Tax U.S. Grids,
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 21, 2015, 5:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-1221/as-pot-growing-expands-power-demands-tax-u-s-electricity-grids.
264. One Pennsylvania Public Utility Commissioner said, “We are at the edge of
this . . . . We are looking all across the country for examples and best practices.” Id.
265. REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, ELECTRICITY REGULATION IN THE US 12 (2011),
http://www.raponline.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/rap-lazar-electricityregulationintheusguide-2011-03.pdf.
266. Warren, supra note 259, at 411–12.
267. 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016).
268. Id. at 766.
269. See supra notes 219–20 and accompanying text.
270. Melanie Sevcenko, Pot Is Power Hungry: Why the Marijuana Industry’s Energy
Footprint Is Growing, GUARDIAN (Feb. 27, 2016, 8:58 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2016/feb/27/marijuana-industry-huge-energy-footprint.
271. Id.
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Cultivation licensing and the power granted to local governments to
enact unique marijuana regulations, both common features of early
marijuana regulation frameworks, provide a fruitful opportunity to
impose efficiency standards or clean energy requirements on marijuana
farmers. Boulder, Colorado, and Humboldt County, California, for
example, require indoor farming operations to obtain 100% of their
energy needs from renewable energy sources.272 In cases where
renewable energy is not available to meet the demands of indoor
operations, Boulder County imposes a tax on consumers (2.16 cents per
kWh), from which a portion of the revenue funds sustainable marijuana
cultivation projects and education programs.273
Another promising approach is to encourage or require indoor
agricultural operations to schedule their light cycles to coincide with
periods of low demand for the electrical grid as a whole. Off-peak hours
typically take place at night, while peak hours occur during the hottest
periods of the day.274 But to plants grown indoors, outdoor conditions are
irrelevant, and because off-peak energy is typically less expensive, there
is reason to believe farmers will be enthusiastic about programs that
facilitate “smart-metering” of electricity.275 Electricity providers have an
interest in preventing power shortages and blow-outs, and methods to
reduce consumption during peak hours are becoming more sophisticated.
While the Supreme Court’s ruling in FERC v. EPSA reinforced federal
authority over electricity regulation, the regulatory rule in question was
designed to support demand-response programs that provide incentives
for consumers to adjust their consumption patterns.276
Finally, policies designed to address the energy demands of indoor
marijuana agriculture can encourage or mandate that marijuana
agriculture transition to outdoor environments, where solar energy is
freely obtained. There is no botanical need to grow marijuana plants
indoors, but farmers who cultivated marijuana during prohibition are
accustomed to indoor growing techniques, and therefore the practice has
continued.277 Indoor agriculture allows farmers to manipulate growing
272. BOULDER, COLO., REV. CODE § 6-14-8(i) (2017); BOULDER, COLO., REV. CODE § 6-168(i) (2017); Humboldt, Cal., Ordinance 2544 (Jan. 26, 2016).
273. See Res. 2014-41, Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs (Boulder, Colo. 2014) (creating the Boulder
County Energy Impact Offset Fund).
274. Presh Talwalker, Save on Electricity Costs by Avoiding Peak Hours, MIND YOUR
DECISIONS (Aug. 13, 2010), http://mindyourdecisions.com/blog/2010/08/13/save-on-electricitycosts-by-avoiding-peak-hours.
275. See Warren, supra note 259, at 411.
276. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 786
(2016).
277. See, e.g., Sevcenko, supra note 270 (‘“[T]he vast majority of us growers have learned
indoor as a result of prohibition.”’).
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conditions in other beneficial ways, however, and in certain climates
outdoor cultivation would be challenging if not impossible.278 But the
energy and maintenance costs of indoor agriculture are likely to make
outdoor agriculture more enticing as the industry matures. The 2012
energy study estimated that electricity costs for indoor marijuana totaled
$6 billion.279 Outdoor marijuana cultivation creates significant energy
demands, of course, such as water pumping or transportation,280 but as
outdoor techniques improve and become more sustainable, the allure of
natural sunlight may become increasingly attractive for regulators and the
marijuana industry.
D. Certified Organic
There is a robust market for organic agricultural products. In 2014,
organic sales reached an estimated $39 billion, with more and more
Americans buying organic food.281 The rationale is straightforward: As
public awareness of negative environmental and human health impacts
associated with synthetic or non-organic foods or food inputs grows, so
too will the demand for alternative organic agricultural products. One
early form of this public awareness was conservationist Rachel Carson’s
Silent Spring, published in 1962, which identified pesticides such as DDT
as the cause of a variety of observed ecological problems.282 The book,
along with growing public awareness and media coverage of
environmental degradation nationwide, prompted a broad response that
included the passage of major state and federal environmental laws.283

278. Chelsea Harvey, The Surprisingly Huge Energy Footprint of the Booming Marijuana
Industry, WASH. POST (Feb. 18, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energyenvironment/wp/2016/02/18/this-could-be-a-big-problem-for-the-booming-marijuana-industry/
?utm_term=.8fbb0ad99ca5.
279. Mills, supra note 260, at 59.
280. Id. at 62.
281. According to one survey, 84% of Americans purchase organic food. ORGANIC TRADE
ASS’N, STATE OF THE INDUSTRY (2015), http://ota.com/sites/default/files/indexed_files/State
OfOrganicIndustry_0.pdf; see also Rebecca Rivkin, Forty-Five Percent of Americans Seek Out
Organic Foods, GALLUP (AUG. 7, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/174524/forty-five-percentamericans-seek-organic-foods.aspx.
282. RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING 22 (1962).
283. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–44 (2012)); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 92500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012)); National
Environmental Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 4321–47 (2012)); Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7515 (2012)).
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This recognition that human activities and natural systems were
interconnected also prompted a return to organic farming,284 and
eventually, development of a federal organic certification system.285 The
1990 Organic Foods Production Act286 vested authority in the USDA to
develop organic certification regulations.287 The National Organic
Program is now the regulatory framework for organic agriculture and
organic certification.288
Unsurprisingly, there is also a market for organic marijuana.289 As
public awareness of the environmental impact of marijuana agriculture
grows, so too does the pressure on marijuana farmers to adopt sustainable
farming practices. The demand for organic marijuana has prompted a
market response that parallels the market’s response to organic foods in
the 1970s.
Then, in the absence of a federal regulatory framework, third-party
organizations were created to provide independent certifications of
organic agriculture. The Rodale Press established voluntary standards
and a certification program, and helped organize the California Certified
Organic Farmers and Oregon-Washington Tilth Organic Producers
Association.290 States passed their own organic agriculture laws.291
Oregon created the first state organic certification program, and by 1990,
twenty-two states had developed some form of organic regulation.292 As
the demand for organic products increased, however, these piecemeal
approaches became problematic. Fraudulently labelled products flooded
284. Farming practices prior to the twentieth century are typically considered organic
because synthetic pesticides, fertilizers, or genetically modified products had not yet been
developed. See KEITH S. DELAPLANE, PESTICIDE USAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: HISTORY,
BENEFITS, RISKS, AND TRENDS (1996) (noting that pesticide usage did not become popular until
after World War II).
285. See Sara N. Pasquinelli, One False Move: The History of Organic Agriculture and
Consequences of Non-Compliance with the Governing Laws and Regulations, 3 GOLDEN GATE
U. ENVTL. L.J., 365, 370 (2010); Valerie J. Watnick, The Organic Foods Production Act, the
Process/Product Distinction, and a Case for More End Product Regulation in the Organic Foods
Market, 32 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 40, 46 (2014).
286. Pub. L. No. 101-624, 104 Stat. 3935 (1990) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 6501–
23 (2012)).
287. 7 U.S.C. § 6501 (1990); see Kyle W. Lathrop, Note, Pre-empting Apples with Oranges:
Federal Regulation of Organic Food Labeling, 16 J. CORP. L. 885, 895 (1991).
288. 7 U.S.C. §§ 6501í22 (2012).
289. Alice Truong, The Bay Area’s Latest Movement: Organic Marijuana, QUARTZ (Jan. 29,
2015), http://qz.com/334826/the-bay-areas-latest-movement-organic-marijuana/.
290. See BRIAN BAKER, ORGANIC FARMING COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK: A RESOURCE GUIDE
FOR WESTERN REGION AGRICULTURAL PROFESSIONALS 1 (2005); Student Article, Aubrey Parlet,
Organic Foods Production: What Consumers Might Not Know About the Use of Synthetic
Substances, 21 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 392, 395 (2009).
291. Lathrop, supra note 287, at 891–92.
292. Id.
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the market, state laws were inconsistent, and enforcement was
unreliable.293
The federal government substantially occupies the field of organic
agriculture. The term “organic” itself has been federalized, as agricultural
products can only be labelled organic if they were grown in accordance
with federal standards.294 The federal government occupies the
certification process as well, as the need for uniform federal certification
standards and processes was a primary justification for federal organic
legislation in the first place.295 In practice, enforcement of federal organic
legislation often takes place at the state level by state officials
promulgating organic certification programs, but these programs must be
approved by the USDA and in accordance with federal standards.296
Thus, there is room for state involvement in the form of cooperative
federalism,297 but organic agriculture remains a federal field of
regulation.
Because marijuana remains a controlled substance prohibited under
federal law, and organic certification remains a federal field of regulation,
marijuana products cannot be labelled organic regardless of the method
of cultivation.298 Thus far states have not developed their own
certification programs for sustainable marijuana agriculture either. As a
consequence, the marijuana industry has established third-party
certification programs that attempt to recognize organic marijuana
agriculture in indirect ways. Certification programs mirror the USDA’s
organic agriculture requirements, but instead of using the “organic” label,
programs use terms such as “naturally grown,” “Clean Green certified,”
or “Certified Kind.”299
293. Id.
294. 7 U.S.C. § 6505(a)(1) (2012); see also Quesada v. Herb Thymes Farm Inc., 361 P.3d
868, 880 (Cal. 2015) (explaining that uniform federal standards for organic certification were
designed to supplement and enhance state law on the matter).
295. 7 U.S.C. § 6503.
296. Id. § 6507.
297. But see Laura Fisher, Note, Administrative Law—All (Food) Politics Is Local:
Cooperative Federalism, New England Small Farms, and the Food Safety Modernization Act, 37
W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 337, 357 (2015) (calling for more state and local involvement in agricultural
policy).
298. David Migoya & Ricardo Baca, Colorado AG’s Office Investigates Marijuana
Companies Using “Organic,” DENV. POST (Sept. 16, 2015, 12:12 PM),
http://www.denverpost.com/2015/09/16/colorado-ags-office-investigates-marijuana-companiesusing-organic/ (“‘Marijuana may not be certified organic under the USDA organic regulations,’
said a USDA spokesman who could not be named because it’s the agency’s policy when
discussing marijuana. ‘Marijuana is considered a controlled substance at the federal level, and
organic certification is reserved for agricultural products.’”).
299. See, e.g., About Us, Clean Green [in small caps] (last visited Mar. 29,
2017), https://www.cleangreencert.org/about-us/ (“Clean Green Certified was created in 2004 as
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These marijuana certification programs compete with each other to
represent the gold standard for organic agriculture. But as private thirdparty certifiers, their impact on the industry remains limited without a
broader regulatory framework capable of evenly applying and enforcing
labelling standards. Already there is evidence that marijuana being
labelled and sold as “naturally grown” has not undergone certification of
any kind.300 In Colorado, the Colorado Department of Agriculture
provides organic certification and enforcement on behalf of the USDA.301
Those obligations notwithstanding, the term “organic” has been used by
many marijuana businesses in their advertising, product labelling, and
branding, with little to no state enforcement.302
Because the federal government occupies the field of organic
certification, it will be difficult for states to develop their own organic
marijuana programs. The USDA is unlikely to approve amendments to
state organic certification programs that incorporate marijuana
agriculture. Absent robust certification frameworks, farmers will have
few incentives to cultivate marijuana without synthetic pesticides or other
substances that have adverse consequences for the environment and
human health. At the same time, there will continue to be a market benefit
conferred on businesses claiming to grow marijuana organically or
naturally, regardless of the veracity of those claims. Without an
enforcement mechanism of some kind, consumers are likely to be misled
or the terms will begin to lose meaning. States and local jurisdictions may
indirectly encourage organic marijuana cultivation by incorporating
organic standards into their state or local cultivation licensing schemes,
and if these standards are enforced and well-communicated, farmers in
a way to regulate legal cannabis-products that called themselves ‘organic.’ Consumers can rest
assured when they buy a Clean Green Certified cannabis product that it has met all of the
requirements of the rigorous program. Modeled on national and international sustainability,
organic and biodynamic program standards, the Clean Green program requires on-site inspections
and third-party lab testing. Much like third party certifications for traditional agricultural products,
the whole life cycle of the plant is considered, from seed selection to harvesting and processing.
In addition, soil, nutrients, pesticide use, mold treatment and dust control are analyzed. Clean
Green Certified also goes further than the USDA organic in some areas, requiring every operator
to undergo pesticide testing every year, rather than only a small percentage of farms.”); About,
Certified Kind [in small caps] (last visited Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.certified-kind.com/about/
(“Certified Kind offers certification, education, and consultation for cannabis growers and edibles
processors that are committed earth friendly practices. The Certified Kind rules are similar to
USDA Organic but Certified Kind has additional requirements to ensure fair treatment of labor
plus rules that address environmental issues specific to cannabis production. Certified Kind is
guided by leading experts in organic certification compliance.”).
300. Truong, supra note 289.
301. Organic, COLO. DEP’T AGRIC., https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/agplants/organic (last
visited Jan. 28, 2017).
302. See Migoya & Baca, supra note 298.
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that jurisdiction may reap a market benefit.303 More than likely, however,
the organic marijuana industry will struggle to recognize and incentivize
organic farming as long as the federal marijuana prohibition continues.
E. Replacing Federal Agricultural Resilience Programs: Crop
Insurance and Disaster Relief
One of the most important influences on crop production is one that
cannot be controlled: weather. Farmers can control or influence many
aspects of cultivation, including soil conditions, crop type, and the timing
of key activities like seed planting and crop harvesting, but the weather
can be difficult to predict. Routine weather events that fluctuate mildly
from expectations—more or less rain than anticipated, for example—can
have significant consequences for crop yields.304 But extreme weather
events like droughts, freezes, floods, or fires can devastate crops, farmers,
and, in turn, the stability of the market for an agricultural product.305 In
the face of climate change and an increase in weather uncertainty,
developing resilience to environmental variability and extreme events
will become an important goal of agricultural policy.306
If farmers were left to shoulder the burden of climactic uncertainty
alone, there would likely be adverse consequences on rural economies
and the agricultural industry as a whole. Major crop failures could lead
to farm failures, job losses, agricultural business failures, financial sector
stress, and price increases. Farming would become riskier and less
attractive. Recognizing this, U.S. agricultural policy has focused on two
mechanisms to help farmers and the agricultural industry develop
resilience to variability and crop failures.
The first mechanism consists of disaster relief. From 1989 to 2012,
Congress made forty-two emergency funding appropriations that

303. For reasons similar to the benefits of appellations, see Goodhue et al., supra note 205,
at 16.
304. Erik Chavez et al., An End-to-End Assessment of Extreme Weather Impacts on Food
Security, 5 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 997, 997 (2015) (“[C]hanges in the large-scale climate
processes that drive both regional and global climate variability affect the annual onset of rainfall
in the tropics and subtropics, as well as rainfall patterns in temperate latitudes, thus playing a
significant role in the variability of regional rain-fed crop production.”); see Mark R. Rosenzweig
& Hans P. Binswanger, Wealth, Weather and the Composition and Profitability of Agricultural
Investment, 103 ECON. J. 56, 63 (1993).
305. Steffen N. Johnson, A Regulatory ‘Wasteland’: Defining a Justified Federal Role in
Crop Insurance, 72 N.D. L. REV. 505, 507 (1996).
306. See JOHN BEDDINGTON ET AL., CGIAR RESEARCH PROGRAM ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
AGRICULTURE AND FOOD SECURITY: ACHIEVING FOOD SECURITY IN THE FACE OF CLIMATE CHANGE
49 (2012), https://cgspace.cgiar.org/bitstream/handle/10568/35589/climate_food_commissionfinal-mar2012.pdf.
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provided disaster relief to farmers in the amount of $70 billion.307 Most
of that total went directly to farmers to compensate for low commodity
prices or crop failures.308 Disaster relief can be an effective means of
providing resilience and helping communities bounce back from
disasters. Providing disaster relief in the wake of natural disasters
receives broad political support as well.309 But ad hoc disaster relief
presents several problems. First, the knowledge that governments will
provide disaster funding may dissuade farmers from becoming more
resilient (by adjusting their practices or purchasing crop insurance, for
example).310 This, in turn, makes farmers more dependent on disaster
relief. Second, it is hard for governments to anticipate when disaster
funding will be needed, creating a strain on budgets and financial
planning.311
These challenges combine to make ad hoc disaster funding
unappealing in many contexts, including the agriculture industry, and
have prompted Congress to pursue a second resilience mechanism: crop
insurance. In 1938, Congress established the Federal Crop Insurance
Program to support and regulate crop insurance.312 Subsequent legislation
has been enacted with the goal of making crop insurance the primary risk
management tool for the agriculture industry.313 Today, the Federal Crop
Insurance Corporation (FCIC) identifies eligible crops, sets premium
rates, subsidizes premiums, and insures insurers.314 As of 2014, 1.2
million crop insurance policies cover 130 crops, 294 million acres, and
$110 billion in loss coverage.315 Because the government subsidizes
premiums (62%, on average) and covers administrative expenses,316 the
crop insurance program is one of the most costly components of federal
agricultural policy.317 Nonetheless, crop insurance and disaster relief
307. RALPH M. CHITE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., EMERGENCY FUNDING FOR AGRICULTURE: A
BRIEF HISTORY OF SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS, FY1989-FY2012, at 12 (2012).
308. Id. at summary.
309. Erwann Michel-Kerjan & Jacquelin Volkman-Wise, The Risk of Ever-Growing
Disaster Relief Expectations 3–4 (Risk Mgmt. & Decision Processes Ctr., Wharton Sch., Univ. of
Pa., Working Paper No. 2011-09, 2011).
310. See DARRELL L. HUETH & WILLIAM F. FURTAN, ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURE CROP
INSURANCE: THEORY AND EVIDENCE 350 (1994).
311. See Michel-Kerjan & Volkman-Wise, supra note 309, at 3.
312. Federal Crop Insurance Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1503 (2012).
313. H.R. REP. NO. 103-649 (1994); Johnson, supra note 305, at 507.
314. See Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-79, 128 Stat. 649 (to be codified in
scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.).
315. DENNIS A. SHIELDS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FEDERAL CROP INSURANCE: BACKGROUND
2–3 (2015).
316. Id. at 2.
317. Id. at 16 (showing that costs peaked in 2012 at $14.1 billion and declined in 2014 to
$8.7 billion).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol69/iss2/1

50

Stoa: Marijuana Agriculture Law: Regulation At The Root Of An Industry

2017]

MARIJUANA AGRICULTURE LAW: REGULATION AT THE ROOT OF AN INDUSTRY

347

payments comprise a major safety net to the agricultural industry.
Marijuana is not a crop eligible for crop insurance under the FCIC.318
Nor have marijuana farmers ever received federal disaster relief. This is
unsurprising, considering the federal marijuana prohibition established
by the Controlled Substances Act.319 But the federal prohibition has
suppressed the emergence of marijuana crop insurance in the private
sector as well, where most insurers are hesitant to become involved in an
industry that remains illegal on the federal level.320
Without insurance or disaster relief, marijuana farmers are more
vulnerable to extreme events than other farmers, such as droughts, floods,
and, increasingly, wildfires. California’s drought history is wellchronicled,321 and wildfires are particularly threatening to marijuana
crops in the American West, many of which are grown in the wildlandurban interface where fires are most prevalent.322 Floods and fires can
wipe out crops altogether, while droughts and smoke can damage crop
quality.323 Catastrophic crop losses can lead to the same consequences
(farm failures, job losses, business failures, and price increases) for
marijuana just as easily as any other crop.
So far, states and private insurers have only tepidly explored the
possibility of providing crop insurance to marijuana cultivators.
Insurance for dispensaries has led the way, but crop insurance remains an
undeveloped market tool.324 Courts have provided mixed support for
marijuana farmers with these nascent insurance policies. In the 2012 case
Tracy v. USAA Casualty Insurance,325 a federal court in Hawaii agreed
with an insurer that loss of state-legal marijuana plants was not a

318. See Risk Mgmt. Agency, County Crop Programs, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC.,
http://goo.gl/2z6GIi (last visited Mar. 29, 2016) (illustrating the FCIC’s omission of marijuana on
the list of crops eligible for crop insurance).
319. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(vii) (2012).
320. See, e.g., Ed Leefeldt, For Insurers, No Rush to Offer Pot Coverage, CBS MONEY
WATCH (Feb. 24, 2016, 5:15 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/for-insurers-no-rush-to-offerpot-coverage.
321. See, e.g., Paul Rogers, California Drought: How Will We Know When It’s Over?,
MERCURY NEWS (Jan. 9, 2016, 9:40 AM), http://www.mercurynews.com/2016/01/09/californiadrought-how-will-we-know-when-its-over.
322. See Madeleine Thomas, West Coast Weed Farms Are Lighting Up, PAC.
STANDARD (Aug. 31, 2015), https://psmag.com/west-coast-weed-farms-are-lighting-up-d46a122
fafb3#.xyzpghjpm.
323. Id.
324. See, e.g., Michael Roberts, Medical Marijuana Crop Insurance: Putting Your Weed in
Good Hands, WESTWORD (Feb. 10, 2010, 9:10 AM), http://www.westword.com/news/medicalmarijuana-crop-insurance-putting-your-weed-in-good-hands-5864728 (noting that early crop
insurance policies cover only indoor growing operations).
325. No. 11-00487 LEK-KSC, 2012 WL 928186 (D. Haw. Mar. 16, 2012).
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compensable claim under the insurance policy.326 While the court found
that state-legal marijuana plants are an insurable interest,327 the federal
marijuana prohibition preempts state marijuana law and makes the
insurance policy (which purportedly covered the marijuana plants) an
unenforceable contract contrary to public policy.328
In 2016, however, a federal court in Colorado pushed back on that
view in Green Earth Wellness Center v. Atain Specialty Insurance,329
upholding the validity of an insurance policy’s coverage of loss from
wildfire smoke damage to marijuana plants and products.330 Living plants
were excluded from the policy in this instance, but the court nevertheless
rejected the idea that covered losses are not compensable because the
federal prohibition makes insurance claims on marijuana a violation of
federal law and public policy.331 “[I]n light of several additional years
evidencing a continued erosion of any clear and consistent federal public
policy in this area,” the court declined to follow Tracy, instead finding
valid contractual claims in which both parties intended to cover marijuana
products as insurable commodities.332
The Tracy and Green Earth decisions conflict, and it remains to be
seen how other courts address the validity of insurance policies covering
marijuana, particularly marijuana crops. The Green Earth decision paves
the way for marijuana farmers to obtain and enforce private crop
insurance,333 though courts might be more willing to find preemption
concerns since crop insurance is extensively regulated on the federal
level.
In any case, without agricultural support programs like disaster relief
or crop insurance, marijuana farmers and marijuana farming communities
will remain vulnerable to extreme events. This lack of support may
dissuade existing farmers of insured crops from incorporating marijuana
into their crop portfolios, as well, suppressing the normalization of
marijuana cultivation. Intrepid private insurers may be able to provide
some relief in response to market demands, but the validity of marijuana
insurance, and marijuana crop insurance, remains unsettled as a matter of
law. As a consequence, the marijuana industry will not have at its disposal
a primary tool for agricultural risk management for the foreseeable future.

326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.

Id. at *13.
Id. at *10.
Id. at *13.
No. 13-cv-03452-MSK-NYW, 2016 WL 632357 (D. Colo. Feb. 17, 2016).
Id. at *10.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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IV. WHERE TO REGULATE? LOCAL ORDINANCES VS. STATE
REGULATIONS
This Article has explored the major legal and policy challenges that
marijuana agriculture will impose on regulatory frameworks. The final
question to address is: Who should have regulatory authority over
marijuana agriculture? The question raises an issue mostly of policy
rather than law, but there are legal components to power distribution as
well. In short, states have a choice between regulating marijuana
agriculture on the state level, in a centralized and top-down approach, or
decentralizing regulatory authority to counties or municipalities,
allowing each local government to develop its own rules and regulations
for marijuana cultivation. If states retain power for themselves, they can
concentrate that power in a single marijuana regulation agency, or
coordinate responsibilities across existing agencies. If states decentralize
and allow local governments to take a leading role, ordinances governing
marijuana cultivation will be the primary regulatory tool. This Section
concludes with a case study of Humboldt County, California.334 Arguably
the county most intimately familiar with marijuana agriculture, Humboldt
County passed the first-of-its-kind marijuana cultivation ordinance in
January 2016.335 The ordinance provides a model for replication
throughout California and the United States.
A. Marijuana Regulation and Subsidiarity
Whether states choose to keep regulatory authority over marijuana
agriculture at the state level, transfer those powers to local governments,
or adopt a hybrid approach that spreads roles and responsibilities around
government units, there will inevitably be trade-offs. Several states have
embraced a decentralized approach, which certainly has benefits.
Distributing power between local agencies engages those agencies in the
regulatory process. In doing so, the regulatory framework capitalizes on
the localized expertise, heightened awareness of changing conditions
(ecological or economic, for example), and existing relationships
between local stakeholders that collectively form a promising recipe for
good governance.336 Simply put, local actors are knowledgeable about
their community and provide legitimacy to local regulations. Conversely,
top-down policies that do not reflect local realities often meet with
resistance that can manifest itself in noncompliance with regulatory

334. See infra Section IV.C.
335. See Humboldt, Cal., Ordinance 2544, § 55.4.11(a) (Jan. 16, 2016).
336. See Ryan Stoa, Subsidiarity in Principle: Decentralization of Water Resources
Management, 10 UTRECHT L. REV. 31, 34 (2014).
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requirements.337 Finally, by allowing local agencies to create their own
policies or manage their own natural resources, the collective whole
develops resilience by experimenting with different approaches, some of
which might fail while others foster successful innovations that other
jurisdictions can replicate.338
These general benefits of decentralization are particularly applicable
to regulating marijuana agriculture. Marijuana remains a controversial
political issue, the liberalization of which benefits from allowing
legalization opponents to enact policies they are more comfortable
with.339 In regions like northern California, where a large cultivation
community exists in a remote and unique social setting, local officials are
better suited to engage an introverted industry than are state or federal
officials. They are also more likely to develop regulations that reflect the
realities of marijuana cultivation, on the one hand, and the ecological or
economic conditions of the region, on the other hand. The North Coast
Water Quality Control Board, for example, has put forth a water quality
regulation program for marijuana cultivation that was modified based on
feedback from marijuana farmers in the north coast region.340 The Central
Valley Water Quality Control Board did the same in the Central
Valley.341 Both programs are integrated into an inter-agency, statewide
337. In Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville remarked, in his comparison of early
America with France under Louis XIV, that
administrative centralization is suitable only to enervate the peoples who submit
to it, because it constantly tends to diminish the spirit of citizenship in them.
Administrative centralization, it is true, succeeds in gathering at a given time and
in a certain place all the available forces of a nation, but it is harmful to the
multiplication of those forces. It brings the nation victory on the day of battle and
over time reduces its power. So it can work admirably toward the passing
greatness of a man, not toward the lasting prosperity of a people.
1 ALEX DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: HISTORICAL-CRITICAL EDITION 147 (Eduardo
Nolla ed., James T. Schleifer trans., 2010) (1835) (ebook), http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/2285.
338. Stoa, supra note 336, at 34; see Graham R. Marshall, Nesting, Subsidiarity, and
Community-Based Environmental Governance Beyond the Local Level, 2 INT’L J. COMMONS 75,
77 (2008); Elinor Ostrom, Coping with Tragedies of the Commons, 2 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 493,
526 (1999).
339. For an example of a city ordinance that prohibits the indoor or outdoor cultivation of
marijuana in Galt, California, see Jennifer Bonnett, Galt’s Medical Marijuana Rule Takes Effect,
LODI NEWS-SENTINEL (Mar. 5, 2015, 6:10 AM), http://www.lodinews.com/news/article_
7173905e-c341-11e4-be9a-23987e765448.html.
340. REG’L WATER QUALITY CONTROL BD., EXECUTIVE OFFICER’S SUMMARY REPORT 1
(2015), http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/northcoast/board_info/board_meetings/08_2015/items/
07/150728_Cannabis_WDR_EOSR.pdf (documenting that forty-seven comments were received
from the public regarding feedback on the program).
341. General Order for Discharge of Waste Associated with Medical Cannabis Cultivation
Activities, No. R5-2015-0113 (Oct. 2, 2015), http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/centralvalley/
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strategy for marijuana irrigation regulation that should facilitate
coherence across regions.342 This type of regulatory structure is especially
helpful when states are regulating an industry—like marijuana—that is
new or unfamiliar, with few established blueprints for success.
A decentralization strategy, however, has certain vulnerabilities.
Local agencies and jurisdictions may be authorized to develop and
enforce their own regulations, but they may not have the institutional
capacity to do so. Regulating marijuana agriculture may implicate
complex tasks, like hydrological modeling or drug trafficking
enforcement, that local agencies may be ill-equipped to handle.343 Even
when they are, significant reforms may constitute a government taking
requiring compensation, which local agencies may not be able to
afford.344 Regulation requires investments in human, infrastructural, and
technological resources that states may not be able to provide to local
agencies, resulting in some jurisdictions with well-funded agency
operations, and others with little to no regulatory capacities.
A corollary of the institutional capacity challenge is that local
agencies may not be equipped to regulate on two dimensions
simultaneously, as the marijuana-agriculture nexus requires. Colorado’s
Marijuana Enforcement Division, for example, is defined by its
regulatory identification with marijuana, but not agriculture.345 The
state’s Department of Agriculture, conversely, is equipped to regulate
traditional crops but has received little guidance on how to address
marijuana cultivation.346 When the Department reached out to the federal
EPA for guidance on which general crop group (e.g., herbs, spices,
water_issues/cannabis/general_order/r5-2015-0113.pdf (issuing a general order to reduce water
quality impacts associated with cultivation of cannabis).
342. CAL. STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD. ET AL., STRATEGY FOR REGULATION AND
ENFORCEMENT OF UNAUTHORIZED DIVERSIONS; DISCHARGES OF WASTE TO SURFACE AND
GROUNDWATER CAUSED BY MARIJUANA CULTIVATION (2014), http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/
water_issues/programs/enforcement/docs/2014strategicplan_wbcdfw.PDF.
343. Emily Brady’s chronicles of a Humboldt County Deputy Sheriff underline the solitary
and seemingly futile efforts to enforce ambiguous marijuana laws in the region. EMILY BRADY,
HUMBOLDT: LIFE ON AMERICA’S MARIJUANA FRONTIER 48 (2013).
344. See, e.g., Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 568 U.S. 936 (2012).
345. See ENF’T DIV.—MARIJUANA, COLO. DEP’T OF REVENUE, ANNUAL UPDATE (2015),
https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/sites/default/files/2014%20MED%20Annual%20Report_1.pdf.
346. See, e.g., COLO. DEP’T. OF AGRIC., FACTUAL AND POLICY ISSUES RELATED TO THE USE
OF PESTICIDES ON CANNABIS (2016), https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/sites/default/files/atoms/
files/2-2016%20Factual%20and%20Policy%20Issues%20Related%20to%20the%20Use%20of
%20Pesticides%20on%20Cannabis.pdf (receiving little guidance from the federal EPA regarding
pesticide regulations); Letter from John W. Hickenlooper, Governor, Colo., to Tom Vilsack,
Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t. of Agric. (Feb. 20, 2014), https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/sites/default/
files/atoms/files/Letter%20to%20Secretary%20Vilsack.pdf (requesting assistance from the FDA
regarding industrial hemp cultivation).
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vegetables) marijuana fits into for purposes of pesticide regulation, the
EPA could only state that marijuana fits into none of these groups.347
Colorado’s Marijuana Enforcement Division and Department of
Agriculture are both state-level agencies that do not have sufficient
interdisciplinary expertise at present. The challenge can be more
pronounced at local levels where it can be difficult to establish regulatory
capacity on one dimension, much less two.
Efforts to decentralize power away from a central government and
toward local governments can also, if hastily or sloppily designed, look
more like power abdication (in which governments shift an unwanted
burden of regulation onto another jurisdiction) or power fragmentation
(in which regulatory authorities are ambiguously spread between many
different agencies). The former is a problem because while transferring
power from state to local agencies has its benefits, the state retains an
important role to play by supporting and coordinating local initiatives.348
Fragmentation can also be a problem when it leads to overlapping
mandates, uncoordinated regulation, or counter-productive policies.349 If
local agencies are authorized to develop regulations concerning
marijuana cultivation, the authorizations should clearly articulate which
agency has that responsibility, and what the relationship is between that
agency, other agencies, and the state’s broader regulatory framework.
B. State Agency Authority: Consolidation or Cooperation?
If states retain regulatory authority over marijuana agriculture at the
state level, there is a second choice to make regarding power distribution.
Authority can be placed in a single administrative agency responsible for
regulating all aspects of the marijuana industry, or, alternatively, states
can assign different roles and responsibilities to multiple agencies
according to their institutional strengths, and hope the agencies
coordinate well enough to make the overall regulatory framework
coherent.
Colorado, Washington, and Oregon concentrate primary authority for
marijuana regulation in a single state agency: the Colorado Marijuana
347. COLO. DEP’T. OF AGRIC., supra note 346, para. 4.
348. To take a broader view of this point, cooperative federalism frameworks between the
federal and state governments (such as the regulatory structures for the Clean Water Act or Clean
Air Act) have been effective at utilizing the federal government’s funding streams and
establishment of minimum standards to support state-level programs that remain relatively
coherent from a national perspective. See, e.g., Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and
Natural Resources Law, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 179, 230–31 (2005); Ryan B. Stoa, Cooperative
Federalism in Biscayne National Park, 56 NAT. RES. J. 81, 115 (2016); Douglas Williams, Toward
Regional Governance in Environmental Law, 46 AKRON L. REV. 1047, 1086–90 (2013).
349. See Ryan B. Stoa, Water Governance in Haiti: An Assessment of Laws and Institutional
Capacities, 29 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 243 (2017).
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Enforcement Division,350 the Washington Liquor and Cannabis Board,351
and the Oregon Liquor Control Commission,352 respectively. In all three
cases, the agency has primary authority to develop rules and regulations
for marijuana, including aspects of marijuana agriculture. In Colorado,
the Marijuana Enforcement Division is responsible for licensing
cultivators and promulgating “rules for the proper regulation and control
of the cultivation” of marijuana.353 In Washington, legislation authorizes
the “state liquor control board to regulate” marijuana.354 And in Oregon,
the Liquor Control Commission’s functions include the power “to
regulate the purchase, sale, production, processing, transportation, and
delivery of marijuana items.”355
One of the benefits of centralized marijuana regulation is that it may
provide clarity. The administrative agency assigned to (or created for the
purposes of) marijuana regulation is aware of its broad mandate, other
agencies are not confused by their rights and duties, and the private sector
and other stakeholders can direct their attention to a single agency instead
of navigating a complex web of agencies and rules.356 A second benefit
is that states can more clearly invest human and financial resources in a
single agency, whereas distributing those resources across a network of
agencies requires a more nuanced understanding of existing agency
capacities and needs, and investments can more easily become politically
influenced.357 Third, because marijuana implicates a diversity of
processes, including the regulation of cultivation, processing,
distribution, retail sale, and consumption, as well as the agricultural,
economic, and public health components of the marijuana industry, a
single agency with authority over the industry as a whole is well-suited
350. Marijuana Enforcement, COLO. DEP’T REVENUE, https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/
enforcement/marijuanaenforcement (last visited Jan. 30, 2017).
351. WASH. ST. LIQUOR & CANNABIS BOARD, http://www.liq.wa.gov (last visited Jan. 30,
2017).
352. Oregon Liquor Control Commission, ST. OR., http://www.oregon.gov/olcc/marijuana/
Pages/default.aspx (last visited Jan. 29, 2017).
353. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-43.4-202(2)(a)(b) (West 2016).
354. WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.101 note (2015) (Initiative Measure No. 502, approved Nov.
6, 2012).
355. H.R. 3400, 78th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2016) (alteration in original).
356. See Todd S. Aagaard, Regulatory Overlap, Overlapping Legal Fields, and Statutory
Discontinuities, 29 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 237, 286–89 (2011) (discussing the problems with regulatory
overlap, and the resultant duplicative regulation). But see Mark Holden, FDA-EPA Public Health
Guidance on Fish Consumption: A Case Study on Informal Interagency Cooperation in “Shared
Regulatory Space,” 70 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 101, 142 (2015) (concluding that joint guidance in
certain public health realms can yield benefits contrary to current literature on agency overlap).
357. Dan Walters, California’s Multiple Agencies Confusing, SACRAMENTO BEE (Mar. 5,
2016, 7:15 AM), http://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/politics-columns-blogs/danwalters/article64266927.html.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2017

57

Florida Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 1

354

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

to coordinate regulatory activities and create a coherent legal framework
as a whole.
Unfortunately, regulating marijuana agriculture has not been as neat
as states like Colorado, Washington, and Oregon may have initially
expected. Inevitably, perhaps, the expertise and traditional functions of
other agencies have created exceptions to the centralized agency
paradigm. In Colorado, the Department of Agriculture, pursuant to its
duties under the Colorado Pesticide Applicator Act,358 has established
rules for the use of pesticides in marijuana cultivation.359 Recognizing
that pesticide regulations implicate public health, the state assigned an
appropriate regulatory role for the Department of Health and
Environment, as well.360 With this expansion of agency responsibilities,
the Governor established the Office of Marijuana Coordination to foster
collaboration and oversight, despite the relatively central role of the
Marijuana Enforcement Division.361 Washington’s Department of
Agriculture has also taken an increased role in marijuana cultivation,
establishing rules for pesticide and fertilizer use, agricultural worker
safety, and waste disposal.362 The Washington Department of Ecology
has also suggested that marijuana farmers will be subject to the usual
environmental regulations the department oversees.363 Finally, the
Oregon Department of Agriculture, while acknowledging that it is not the
lead agency for marijuana, nonetheless has extensive rules and programs
for marijuana cultivation.364
It would be misleading to suggest that these states intended to
consolidate all marijuana regulatory authority into a single agency, but it
is clear that despite a broad mandate for lead agencies to “regulate
marijuana,” the diverse and interdisciplinary components of the
marijuana industry have forcibly fragmented regulatory authority to some
extent. If an interagency approach is likely, then states may seek to
358. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-10-101 to -128 (West 2016).
359. COLO. DEP’T OF AGRIC., PESTICIDE APPLICATORS’ ACT RULES AND REGULATIONS
§ 17.02 (2016), https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/sites/default/files/atoms/files/3-30-2016%20
PAA%20Cannabis%20Rule%20WEB.pdf.
360. Directing State Agencies to Address Threats to Public Safety Posed by Marijuana
Contaminated by Pesticide, Colo. Exec. Order No. D 2015-015 (Nov. 12, 2015).
361. The Colorado Governor’s Office of Marijuana Coordination did not have a website at
the time of writing. But see Marijuana, COLORADO, https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/
marijuana/about-site (last visited Jan. 30, 2017) (identifying the office and its role).
362. Pesticide and Fertilizer Use on Marijuana in Washington, WASH. ST. DEP’T. AGRIC.,
http://agr.wa.gov/pestfert/pesticides/pesticideuseonmarijuana.aspx (last visited Jan. 29, 2017).
363. Marijuana Licensing and the Environment, WASH. ST. DEP’T ECOLOGY,
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/topics/marijuana.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2017).
364. Cannabis (Marijuana), OR. DEP’T. AGRIC., https://www.oregon.gov/ODA/agriculture/
Pages/Cannabis.aspx (last visited Jan. 29, 2017).
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embrace fragmentation and focus on coordinating the various regulatory
activities of different agencies. California has largely adopted this
approach. In January 2016, twenty years after the Compassionate Use Act
of 1996 legalized medical marijuana in the state, the Medical Marijuana
Regulation and Safety Act (MMRSA) came into effect.365 One of the
MMRSA’s bills, AB 243, “would require the Department of Food and
Agriculture, the Department of Pesticide Regulation, the State
Department of Public Health, the Department of Fish and Wildlife, and
the State Water Resources Control Board to promulgate regulations or
standards relating to medical marijuana and its cultivation.”366 In
addition, AB 243 requires that cities, counties, and their enforcement
agencies coordinate with state agencies to implement the law, creating a
self-described “state-mandated local program.”367 A companion bill, AB
266, creates the Bureau of Medical Marijuana Regulation,368 but its
regulatory functions are narrowly tailored and do not consist of broad
authority to “regulate marijuana.”
The advantages of a regulatory framework that distributes roles for
marijuana regulation to a variety of administrative agencies are
numerous. By leaving intact the existing functions and dynamics of state
agencies, a framework of this nature is less disruptive than one that
consolidates broad responsibilities in a single agency. Agencies have
developed subject matter expertise, and this approach takes advantage of
that existing knowledge and may not require as many financial or human
investments to build up institutional capacities. In addition, by embracing
the status quo regulatory structure, states may take advantage of existing
partnerships, stakeholder relationships, and interagency programs that
enhance interdisciplinary regulation. It is more likely that this approach
will normalize marijuana cultivation because a broad spectrum of
agencies is responsible for incorporating the marijuana industry into their
regulatory frameworks, increasing engagement with the industry and the
likelihood that emerging issues will be addressed by appropriate officials.
There are, inevitably, drawbacks to this approach. The primary
challenge is that interagency coordination is notoriously difficult.369 It is
easy for the California legislature to ask a multitude of state agencies to
create appropriate rules and regulations; it is not easy for those agencies
to create them in an integrated, coordinated, and coherent way. It remains
to be seen if these agencies will succeed in their mission. Compounding
this coordination challenge is California’s “state-mandated local
365. A.B. 243, 2015–16 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015); A.B. 266, 2015–16 Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015); S. 643, 2015–16 Sess. (Cal. 2015).
366. A.B. 243.
367. Id.
368. A.B. 266.
369. Aagaard, supra note 356, at 288; see Stoa, supra note 349, at 115.
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program,” requiring agencies to not only coordinate with each other on
the horizontal governance axis, but to coordinate with local governments
on the vertical governance axis as well. Prior to enactment of the
MMRSA, the state’s water quality regulators were trying to convince
marijuana farmers in northern California to buy into their water quality
monitoring program at the same time that sheriff’s departments were
conducting raids and making arrests.370
Aside from the coordination challenge, fragmentation of authority
may create compliance problems for the marijuana industry. It will be
more difficult for marijuana farmers to comply with state and local laws
if each agency has extensive permitting or licensing procedures.
Considering the marijuana industry’s black market history, if these
procedures are too onerous, many farmers may be tempted to remain in
the shadows. And while agencies have specialized expertise in their fields
of practice, it is not clear that existing capacities will be sufficient to
address the novel and burgeoning marijuana industry. It may be, instead,
that investments will need to be made to understand the nuances of
marijuana cultivation, and to make those investments for each agency
may not be an efficient allocation of resources.
Regardless of approach, states will need to address the challenges of
consolidation or cooperation. In making these distinctions, this Article
does not suggest that the choice is black and white. Inevitably, states that
prefer a consolidated approach will need to involve other state agencies
to some extent, while states that prefer a coordinated approach will need
to integrate efforts to create an efficient and coherent regulatory
framework. States should not assume that a single agency can regulate all
aspects of marijuana agriculture, nor should they assume that existing
agencies can address regulatory challenges by applying traditional
methods. An important factor for power distribution may be the
characteristics and track record of a state’s administrative landscape: If a
state has a strong track record of agency coordination, the coordinated
approach makes sense. If it does not, consolidating authority into a single
agency may be the best way to develop a regulatory framework in a
timely and responsive manner.
C. The Future of Marijuana Ordinances: Humboldt County, California,
Leads the Way
As the California MMRSA demonstrates, local governments may play
a strong role in regulating marijuana agriculture, regardless of whether
states retain substantial regulatory powers. Granting counties and cities
the power to adopt their own rules and regulations appears to be a
common feature in the early legalization states, such as California and
370. Baumann, supra note 16; Media Release, Cal. Water Bds., supra note 254.
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Colorado. The cause is likely multi-faceted. States may want to foster a
multitude of regulatory approaches to experiment with and identify those
rules and regulations that might work best on the state level. In addition,
because legalization has thus far taken place primarily by ballot initiative,
legislatures may be politically hesitant to embrace the marijuana industry,
and providing a strong role for local governments may be an effective
means of reducing political conflicts.
In any case, local governments are likely to use their power to make
ordinances the primary legal mechanism to regulate marijuana
agriculture. Ordinances have the force of law, and can regulate a variety
of local issues, such as public health and safety, land use, and use of
public spaces. State constitutions or state statutes grant counties or
municipalities the power to enact ordinances. The California MMRSA,
for example, authorizes local governments to enact local laws in
accordance with the state statute.371 Colorado grants extensive powers to
city and county governments, allowing them to increase taxes or prohibit
marijuana cultivation altogether.372 Washington did not initially grant
cities and counties the power to enact marijuana regulations, but many
municipalities took it upon themselves to enact their own regulations
anyway, a practice that was subsequently upheld in Green Collar LLC v.
Pierce County.373
In many of these cases, local governments are using ordinances to
prohibit marijuana cultivation, sale, or consumption.374 In other cases,
ordinances have made relatively minor adjustments to state
regulations.375 Thus far, local ordinances have not been a major tool for
the regulation of marijuana agriculture. In that respect, Humboldt County,
California, may be the first county in the United States to enact a
comprehensive marijuana agriculture ordinance.

371. A.B. 266 (Section 19316(a) reads: “Pursuant to Section 7 of Article XI of the California
Constitution, a . . . county may adopt ordinances that establish additional standards, requirements,
and regulations for local licenses and permits for commercial cannabis activity.”).
372. COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16(5)(b)(II)(f).
373. Green Collar, LLC v. Pierce County, No. 14-2-11323-0, 2014 WL 8187081 (Wash.
Super. Ct. 2014); see 2014 Op. Att’y Gen. 2 (Wash.), 2014 WL 201832.
374. Seventy-five cities or counties in Washington have banned marijuana. See Map of
Zoning Ordinances, Marijuana Regulation in Washington State, MRSC, http://mrsc.org/
Home/Explore-Topics/Legal/Regulation/Marijuana-Regulation-in-Washington-State.aspx (last
visited Jan. 29, 2017). As of December 2014, 165 municipalities had banned marijuana in
Colorado. See John Aguilar & Jon Murray, Colorado Cities and Towns Take Diverging Paths on
Recreational Pot, DENV. POST (Dec. 19, 2014, 1:05 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/
2014/12/19/colorado-cities-and-towns-take-diverging-paths-on-recreational-pot-2/.
375. Richland, Wash., Ordinance 01-13 (Jan. 15, 2013).
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When the MMRSA was signed into law in October 2015, an
“inadvertent drafting error” in AB 243 appeared to require that local
jurisdictions implement marijuana cultivation regulations by March 1,
2016; otherwise that power would return to the state Department of Food
and Agriculture.376 The inadvertently narrow timeframe made it
unrealistic for most cities and counties to develop a comprehensive
marijuana agriculture regulation framework. An urgency statute was
signed into law in February 2016,377 eliminating the March 1 deadline,
but by that time many local governments had retained their authority by
simply banning marijuana cultivation,378 an outcome that was not the
intent of the statute.
Humboldt County, however, had been working diligently to create the
most robust marijuana agriculture framework by the March 1 deadline,
and the Commercial Medical Marijuana Land Use Ordinance (Marijuana
Ordinance) was enacted in late January 2016.379 In part, Humboldt
County was able to meet the deadline because it had been working on the
Marijuana Ordinance for several years, in collaboration with marijuana
industry groups and farming representatives.380 The close collaboration
between local officials and industry representatives enabled the
ordinance drafting process to move forward quickly and with political
support, a dynamic that may prove equally helpful in other jurisdictions.
The Marijuana Ordinance itself is relatively comprehensive in scope,
addressing farming styles (indoor, outdoor, and mixed), historical use
protections and benefits for existing farms, tiered permitting
requirements based on zoning classifications, total farm acreage and
marijuana cultivation area, water quantity and quality protections, energy
use, and farm labor standards. The ordinance addresses many of the
issues explored in this Article, and the choices those issues present to
local governments. The ordinance represents a clear attempt to regulate
376. See Letter from Jim Wood, Assemb. Member, 2d Dist., to Cty. & City Gov’t Officials
(2016).
377. A.B. 21, 2015–16 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016).
378. For a list of ordinances banning marijuana, see Bans by County, CAL. NORML,
www.canorml.org/bansbycounty.xlsx (last visited Jan. 29, 2017).
379. Humboldt, Cal., Ordinance 2544, § 55.4.9 (Jan. 16, 2016).
380. The final ordinance was substantially based on a model marijuana agriculture ordinance
developed by the California Cannabis Voice Humboldt, and transferred to the Humboldt County
Board of Supervisors. See Interview with Anonymous Member of California Cannabis Voice
Humboldt, supra note 177; Ryan Burns, County Takes the Reins on Marijuana Regs as CCVH
Steps Back, LOCAL COAST OUTPOST (Sept. 15, 2015, 3:14 PM), https://lostcoastoutpost.com/
2015/sep/15/county-takes-reins-marijuana-regs/; Humboldt Supervisors to Use CCVH as
Framework for Local Marijuana Regulations, NEWS CHANNEL 3, http://kiem-tv.com/video/
humboldt-supervisors-use-ccvh-ordinance-framework-local-marijuana-regulations (last visited
Jan. 29, 2017).
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marijuana agriculture in a tailored fashion; marijuana cultivation limits
(no more than one acre) indicate a preference for small-scale farming and
a rejection of large-scale consolidation models,381 demonstration of
sufficient water rights and water quality compliance permits are
required,382 and energy used in indoor farms must come from renewable
sources or be offset with carbon credits.383 The ordinance even attempts
to create a “Humboldt Artisanal Branding” certification program for
small-scale, organic marijuana farms.384 The Marijuana Ordinance does
not address crop insurance or disaster relief, but local governments are
not well-suited to provide financial services of this nature.
The central tension local governments face when regulating marijuana
agriculture, particularly in jurisdictions where marijuana is already a
primary crop, is between the need to bring farmers out of the shadows
and into the regulatory system, on the one hand, and the need to create
and enforce regulations that have a meaningful impact on cultivation and
the direction and impact of the industry, on the other hand. The Marijuana
Ordinance addresses this tension by incentivizing existing farmers to
register and participate with the county by providing benefits to those
farmers who step forward within 180 days following passage of the
Ordinance.385 Those benefits include a larger maximum cultivation area
(43,560 square feet, as opposed to a maximum 10,000 square feet for new
farms),386 as well as a certificate of good standing for purposes of priority
processing of state permits.387 Additionally, the ordinance incentivizes
the retirement and relocation of existing farms located in environmentally
sensitive areas by allowing farmers to cultivate an area four times larger
in environmentally resilient areas.388
It remains to be seen if the certificate of good standing will have
meaningful value, but the cultivation area restrictions on new farms
(which would include existing farms that chose not to register by the
deadline) are significant, and may ultimately provide a pronounced
advantage to existing farmers, who can cultivate an area over four times
larger than new farmers. In my conversations with farmers in the county,
“to legalize or not to legalize” has been a frequent topic of debate.389
Considering the isolationist nature of the marijuana farming industry in
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.

Ordinance 2544, § 55.4.9.
Id. § 55.4.10(c)–(i).
Id. § 55.4.8.3.
Id. § 55.4.15.
Id. § 55.4.9.4.
Id. § 55.4.9.
Id. § 55.4.9.4.
Id. § 55.4.14.
Interview with Marijuana Farmers, in Willow Creek, Cal. (Mar. 15, 2016).
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northern California, that debate is a promising sign for the county.
In other aspects, the Marijuana Ordinance is less well thought-out. It
is logical to require that marijuana farmers have water rights (either
riparian or by appropriation) sufficient to meet their agricultural needs,390
as well as water use plans and other documents certifying water use,391
but the ordinance may require water rights holders to agree to forego any
water diversions from May 15 to October 31.392 Instead, marijuana
farmers would be required to collect and store water during the rainy
season in quantities sufficient for the dry season. While there is some
evidence that water used for purposes of marijuana cultivation may have
adverse effects on water resources during periods of low flow,393 the
ordinance’s prohibition on dry season water use as a general rule is
unprecedented.394
The environmental impacts of this rule are unclear, as well. While wet
season flows are high and waterways can likely support an increase in
diversions, ecological processes may depend on these traditionally high
flows, and widespread wet season diversions and water storage may
disrupt the wet season environment.395 In addition, because irrigation
demands are substantial during the dry season, the environmental impact
of building large storage tanks on every marijuana farm, necessitating
building materials, construction waste, and a storage footprint, may
outweigh the benefits intended by the rule. Moreover, if marijuana
390. Ordinance 2544, §§ 55.4.10(e), 55.4.11(c).
391. Id. § 55.4.10(f)–(i).
392. Id. § 55.4.11(l).
Where surface water diversion provides any part of the water supply for
irrigation of cannabis cultivation, the applicant shall either: 1) consent to forebear
from any such diversion during the period from May 15th to October 31st of each
year and establish on-site water storage for retention of wet season flows
sufficient to provide adequate irrigation water for the size of the area to be
cultivated, or 2) submit a water management plan prepared by a qualified person
such as a licensed engineer, hydrologist, or similar qualified professional, that
establishes minimum water storage and forbearance period, if required, based
upon local site conditions, or 3) obtain approval from the RWQCB through
enrollment pursuant to NCRWQB Order No.2015-0023 and/or preparation of a
Water Resources Protection Plan.
Id.
393. See sources cited supra note 13.
394. There are, of course, instances in which water rights must be correlatively curtailed
during unusually dry seasons, but it appears that no water regulation framework prohibits water
rights holders growing certain crops from making use of their water resources on a seasonal basis.
395. See, e.g., Charles Batchelor et al., Do Water Saving Technologies Improve
Environmental Flows, 518 J. HYDROLOGY 140, 148 (2014) (arguing that water-saving methods
may often have perverse results on water resources).
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farmers find this rule unreasonable and infeasible, they may reject the
ordinance and regulatory process as a whole.
Cognizant of its shortcomings and the hurried nature of its drafting,
the authors of the Marijuana Ordinance included a flexibility provision
that may reassure skeptical farmers that compliance is attainable. If, upon
inspection, a marijuana farm does not comply with the requirements of
the ordinance, a farmer may nonetheless be granted a provisional license,
as well as a two-year window within which to cure the violation.396 The
provision is not only generous with respect to the compliance grace
period, but also may provide enough time for county officials and
marijuana farming representatives to address problematic aspects of the
ordinance and make amendments prior to enforcement of violations. It
will take time for farmers to adjust to the dry season water use ban, if they
adjust at all, but two years may be sufficient to devise wet-season storage
infrastructure or develop an alternative water use plan with the county
and state officials.
It is clear that marijuana ordinances are in their infancy. So far most
local governments have only superficially addressed marijuana
agriculture. Humboldt County, however, has capitalized on its economic
and political ties with the marijuana farming community to develop a
first-of-its-kind marijuana agriculture ordinance. It remains to be seen if
the county’s marijuana farmers buy into the regulatory framework, but
initial signs are promising.397 As marijuana legalization and regulation
moves forward, the Humboldt County Marijuana Ordinance may prove
to be a model for local governments.
CONCLUSIONS
Many continue to ignore the agricultural element of the marijuana
industry, but there are signs that the regulatory blind-spot is starting to
change. Every year California celebrates Agriculture Day outside the
state capitol, welcoming agriculture industry representatives to display
exhibits and meet with state lawmakers.398 Agriculture Day 2016 had a
new flavor, however, as the marijuana industry, including farmers and
lobbyists, came out in force.399 And Humboldt County has not been the
only county to consider comprehensive agricultural reforms that address
396. Ordinance 2544, § 55.4.11(a).
397. But see Will Houston, Marijuana Group Poised to Sue County, EUREKA TIMESSTANDARD (Feb. 25, 2016, 4:13 PM), http://www.times-standard.com/article/NJ/20160225/
NEWS/160229929.
398. AG Day 2016, CAL. DEP’T FOOD & AGRIC. (Mar. 30, 2016), https://goo.gl/96k0Go.
399. Jeremy B. White, California Ag Day Attracts Budding Marijuana Industry,
SACRAMENTO BEE (Mar. 15, 2016, 11:00 PM), http://www.sacbee.com/news/politicsgovernment/capitol-alert/article66264227.html.
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marijuana cultivation. Mendocino County has proposed a regulatory
framework that would acknowledge, if not address, many of the
marijuana agriculture issues identified in this study. Drafts for the
proposal call for cultivation-area size limits to prevent large-scale farms
from dominating the market, compliance with environmental regulations,
a residency requirement to protect local farmers, and consideration of an
organic certification program or appellation system.400 Meanwhile, the
public has raised concerns about whether the county has the regulatory
capacity to enforce the program, as well as whether marijuana farmers
would actually participate.401
These are themes and issues that local and state governments will face
as they legalize marijuana cultivation. And while recognizing that the
marijuana industry has an agricultural component is a step in the right
direction, awareness is not enough. States and local governments will
need to develop, monitor, and enforce regulatory systems that address the
most pressing agricultural challenges the marijuana industry poses.
Especially during times of transition, the stakes are high. States will need
to find the Goldilocks regulation that is “just right” for the marijuana
industry and local environments. Failing to regulate marijuana
agriculture, or regulating too loosely, will have consequences: the
industry may evolve into a form that does not serve the public interest or
existing marijuana farmers; the environmental impacts of unregulated
marijuana cultivation will likely become more pronounced; marijuana
farmers will have few incentives to cultivate using the most responsible
or sustainable agricultural practices. On the other hand, onerous
regulatory approaches will not serve the public or the marijuana industry,
either: existing marijuana farmers may be reluctant to participate in legal
systems and may therefore perpetuate a black market for marijuana;
existing farmers growing other crops may similarly be dissuaded from
incorporating marijuana into their crop portfolios;402 if states or local
governments lack the capacity to enforce rigorous regulatory programs,
the law will be a regulation in name only.403
For these reasons, it is appropriate that governments work with the
marijuana industry and adopt an incremental or gradual approach that
remains flexible enough to respond to regulatory successes and failures.
As each state or locality presents a unique economic, environmental, and
400. Jane Futcher, Ad Hoc-ing Mendo’s Pot Rules, ANDERSON VALLEY ADVERTISER (Mar.
23, 2016), http://theava.com/archives/54206.
401. Id.
402. See, e.g., Ezra David Romero, Could Marijuana Become California’s Next Big Ag
Crop?, KQED NEWS (Feb. 16, 2016), https://ww2.kqed.org/news/2016/02/16/could-marijuanabecome-californias-next-big-ag-crop.
403. See White, supra note 27 (“If they set up too rigorous of a program then they will not
get buy-in, and if they don’t get buy-in nothing has changed . . . .”).
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political context, no single regulatory approach to marijuana agriculture
will suffice for adoption across the board. However, it is likely that as
governments experiment with marijuana agriculture regulations, certain
aspects or principles will emerge.
It seems likely, for example, that states or local governments will
create certification programs for organic or sustainably grown marijuana
that encourages particular farming practices and adds value to certain
types of marijuana products. Given widespread fears that the marijuana
industry will turn into a commoditized, consolidated Big Ag business
dominated by conglomerates, limits on cultivation area may become a
common regulatory feature. It remains to be seen, however, if this will
push the industry toward adopting the appellation model favored by the
wine industry.
Environmental regulations present some uncertainties. While existing
environmental regulations that address agricultural practices could be
applied to the marijuana industry, in some circumstances those
regulations may be excessive for purposes of marijuana cultivation, while
in other circumstances lawmakers may prefer to use marijuana
legalization as an opportunity to impose more robust environmental
regulations. Humboldt County’s dry-season water-withdrawal
prohibition or renewable energy requirement are prime examples of
regulations tailored to the marijuana industry that go beyond what would
normally be expected for agricultural cultivation.
Finally, state and local governments will need to decide where to place
regulatory authority for marijuana agriculture. This is a particularly
muddled issue because the federal government, traditionally heavily
involved in agricultural policy, is not a participant in the emerging
practice of marijuana agriculture regulation. States may consolidate
authority into one state agency, delegate responsibilities to several
agencies, or empower local governments to impose their own regulatory
frameworks. Each approach has trade-offs and implications for marijuana
agriculture.
This diversity of regulatory options may create an element of
confusion for states and the marijuana industry, and this Article has
attempted to clear up that confusion by identifying the most problematic
regulatory issues, as well as the approaches that are best suited to address
them. And while the way forward may lack consensus, regulatory
experimentation may eventually catalyze the adoption of legal
frameworks that are responsive to the realities of the marijuana industry,
institutional capacities, and the natural environment. Regulation of
marijuana agriculture is in its infancy, and in these early days it is
inevitable that some regulations will create more problems than they
solve. But with infancy comes the potential for tremendous growth, and
regulatory challenges may provide an important opportunity for states
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and the marijuana industry to collaboratively shape the future of
marijuana agriculture.
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